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State Constitutional Initiative Processes and 
Governance in the Twenty-First Century 
John Dinan* 
INTRODUCTION 
Of the direct democratic devices available in American 
states, none has generated more scrutiny than constitutional 
initiative processes. There is no denying the key role played by 
other direct democratic mechanisms. Governors in California and 
Wisconsin have recently been subjected to—and in one case 
removed from office by—recall elections,1 a device available in 
nineteen states.2 Citizen-initiated statutory referendums, 
available in twenty-four states,3 were employed recently in Ohio 
to overturn a statute limiting collective bargaining and in Maine 
to restore election-day voter registration.4 Citizens have relied on 
the statutory initiative process to enact a range of policies5 in the 
twenty-one states providing for this device.6 However the 
constitutional initiative process, available in eighteen states,7 
attracts particular interest in view of the importance of state 
constitutions and the ability to make changes in governing 
institutions, rights, and policies.  
Consider a sample of changes achieved through constitutional 
initiative processes in the twenty-first century alone. 
Minimum-wage increases were adopted in Florida, Nevada, 
 
 * Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University. I have 
benefited from the work of and conversations with Steven Steinglass, Dean Emeritus of 
the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. I also benefited from comments from participants 
at an Oklahoma City University School of Law workshop where a version of this Article 
was presented. 
 1 Recall of State Officials, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 11, 2013), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/recall-of-state-officials.aspx [http:// 
perma.cc/D3U6-6BNJ]. 
 2 HENRY S. NOYES, THE LAW OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY 32 (2014). 
 3 Id. at 78. 
 4 Shanna Rose & Cynthia J. Bowling, The State of American Federalism 
2014−15: Pathways to Policy in an Era of Party Polarization, 45 PUBLIUS 351, 356 (2015). 
 5 Caroline J. Tolbert, Public Policy and Direct Democracy in the Twentieth 
Century: The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, in THE BATTLE OVER 
CITIZEN LAWMAKING 35, 38–39 (M. Dane Waters ed., 2001). 
 6 Initiative and Referendum States, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx 
[http://perma.cc/8NV3-SVZL] (last updated Sept. 2012).  
 7 Id.  
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Colorado, and Ohio.8 Limits on affirmative action were imposed 
in Michigan and Nebraska.9 Colorado legalized recreational 
marijuana.10 Class sizes in Florida public schools were reduced.11 
The sales tax, as well as income taxes on upper-income earners, 
was raised in California.12 Citizen-initiated amendments in 
Arizona, California, and Florida brought significant changes in 
the rules and procedures for drawing state and congressional 
districts.13  
In view of the importance of constitutional initiative 
processes, scholars have been led to assess their consequences 
and consider ways they might be designed to best harness their 
beneficial effects and minimize their harms. A number of 
scholars have analyzed the constitutional initiative as part of 
broader studies of direct democratic devices.14 Some have focused 
on constitutional initiative processes in particular.15 Among other 
things, scholars have considered whether these processes permit 
enactment of reforms resisted by self-interested legislators16 or 
blocked by powerful groups,17 and on the other hand, whether 
they facilitate passage of measures unduly constraining policy 
 
 8 John Dinan, Policy Provisions in State Constitutions: The Standards and Practice 
of State Constitution-Making in the Post-Baker v. Carr Era, 60 WAYNE L. REV. 155, 
190−91 (2014). 
 9 Id. at 190. 
 10 Id. at 189. 
 11 See John Dinan, The Past, Present, and Future Role of State Constitutions, in 
GUIDE TO STATE POLITICS AND POLICY 19, 28–29 (Richard G. Niemi & Joshua J. Dyck 
eds., 2014). 
 12 CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 36(f); see also Dinan, supra note 8, at 192. 
 13 Dinan, supra note 8, at 187; Dinan, supra note 11, at 28. 
 14 See generally THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF 
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL (1989); RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC 
DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002); ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE 
POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT 
LEGISLATION (1999); DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
(2013); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN 
THE UNITED STATES (1984); JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE 
INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004); KENNETH P. MILLER, 
DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS (2009); DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN 
LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION (1989). 
 15 See generally Janice C. May, The Constitutional Initiative: A Threat to Rights?, in 
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE STATES: NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING 
(Stanley H. Friedelbaum ed., 1988); Dennis W. Arrow, Representative Government and 
Popular Distrust: The Obstruction/Facilitation Conundrum Regarding State 
Constitutional Amendment by Initiative Petition, 17 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 3 (1992); John 
F. Cooper, The Citizen Initiative Petition to Amend State Constitutions: A Concept Whose 
Time Has Passed, or a Vigorous Component of Participatory Democracy at the State 
Level?, 28 N.M. L. REV. 227 (1998); Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State 
Constitutions Seriously, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (2008). 
 16 See discussion infra Section II.A. 
 17 See discussion infra Section II.B. 
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flexibility18 or impairing rights.19 As for the design of these 
processes, analysts have focused on the wide range of rules for 
placing citizen-initiated amendments on the ballot and securing 
their ratification.20 
I revisit these scholarly analyses by compiling and drawing 
on a data-set of the full range of proposed and enacted 
constitutional initiatives in the twenty-first century. My purpose 
is to assess the extent to which citizen-initiated amendments 
adopted from 2000–2014 offer support for scholarly claims about 
their consequences, with the aim of evaluating options available 
for structuring these processes so they contribute to effective 
governance.  
I. USE OF CONSTITUTIONAL INITIATIVE PROCESSES IN THE  
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY  
A total of 203 citizen-initiated amendments appeared on 
state ballots from 2000–2014, and 83 were approved.21 However, 
these measures were not distributed evenly across this period,22 
or among the states.23 Additionally, some topics were addressed 
on a particularly frequent basis.24 
 
 18 See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 19 See discussion infra Section II.D. 
 20 See discussion infra Part III. 
 21 These totals are drawn in nearly all cases from annual totals reported in The Book 
of the States, as modified for the year 2006 so as not to count one Nevada amendment that 
was approved on the first of two required passages and also not to count one Colorado 
measure that was mislabeled in The Book of the States as a rejected amendment but was 
actually a rejected statutory initiative, and as modified also for the year 2008 so as not to 
count one Colorado measure that was mislabeled in The Book of the States as a rejected 
amendment but was actually a rejected statutory initiative. See Janice C. May, State 
Constitutions and Constitutional Revision 2000-2001, in 34 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 
2002, at 3, 22 tbl.1.6 (2002); Janice C. May, Trends in State Constitutional Amendment 
and Revision, in 35 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2003, at 3, 18 tbl.1.6 (2003); 2003 Ballot 
Measures, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/2003_ballot_measures [http://perma.cc/X7 
3K-NUZX]; Janice C. May, State Constitutional Developments in 2004, in 37 THE BOOK OF 
THE STATES 2005, at 3, 18 tbl.1.6 (2005); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments 
in 2005, in 38 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2006, at 3, 16 tbl.1.5 (2006); John Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2006, in 39 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2007, at 3, 16 tbl.1.5 
(2007); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2007, in 40 THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2008, at 3, 6 tbl.C (2008); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2008, 
in 41 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2009, at 3, 7 tbl.C (2009); John Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2009, in 42 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2010, at 3, 7 tbl.C 
(2010); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2010, in 43 THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2011, at 3, 7 tbl.C (2011); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2011, 
in 44 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2012, at 3, 9 tbl.C (2012); John Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2012, in 45 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2013, at 3, 6 tbl.C 
(2013); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, in 46 THE BOOK OF THE 
STATES 2014, at 3, 6 tbl.C (2014); John Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2014, 
in 47 THE BOOK OF THE STATES 2015, at 3, 6 tbl.C (2015).  
 22 See discussion infra Section I.A.  
 23 See discussion infra Section I.B. 
 24 See discussion infra Section I.C. 
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A.  Use by Year 
The rate of proposed and enacted citizen-initiated 
amendments varied during the years covered by this period, as 
shown in Table 1.25 As is generally the case with other ballot 
measures, and largely because many states permit such 
measures only in even-numbered years, citizen-initiated 
amendments are considered less frequently in odd-numbered 
years. In several odd-numbered years, not a single 
citizen-initiated amendment appeared on a state ballot. But 
even-numbered years occasionally featured more than thirty 
citizen-initiated amendments.26  
Table 1: Constitutional Initiative Use by Year: Number of 
Enactments/Proposals27 
Year Number of Enactments/Proposals 















* These totals exclude instances where Nevada voters gave the first of two required 
approvals to constitutional initiatives, as occurred in 2000, 2004 (two amendments), and 
2006. In each of these cases, Nevada amendments are considered to have been proposed 
and enacted in the year they received their second and final approval by voters. 
‡ The number of enacted amendments excludes one Oregon amendment, Proposition 7, 
that appeared to secure a majority, but the Secretary of State was precluded from 
conducting a final canvass of votes due to a legal challenge. 
It is also worth noting that citizen-initiated amendments 
were proposed and enacted more frequently in the earlier part of 
the 2000–2014 period than in recent years. The year 2000 was 
the high-water mark for proposals (thirty-two), and the year 2004 
 
 25 See infra Table 1. For an historical perspective on the rate of proposals and 
enactments by decade up through the mid-1980s, see May, supra note 15, at 165. 
 26  See supra note 21. 
 27  See id. 
 27  See id. 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:51 AM 
2016] State Constitutional Initiative Processes & Governance 65 
featured the highest number of enactments (seventeen). At the 
other end of the spectrum, fewer constitutional initiatives were 
proposed (eight) and enacted (two) in 2014 than in any other 
even-numbered year in the twenty-first century.28 
B.  Use by State 
Constitutional-initiative use varied significantly across the 
eighteen states with such processes, as shown in Table 2.29 On 
one hand, voters in two states—Illinois and Massachusetts—did 
not vote on any citizen-initiated amendments during this period. 
On the other hand, voters in several states considered 
constitutional initiatives on a regular basis. In California and 
Colorado, voters encountered, on average, more than two 
citizen-initiated amendments per year, with Oregon voters 
passing judgment on just under two citizen-initiated 
amendments per year. Florida voters approved more 
citizen-initiated amendments than any other state, voting in 
favor of seventeen of nineteen citizen-initiated amendments 
appearing on the ballot.  
Table 2: Constitutional Initiative Use by State from 2000–2014:  
Number of Enactments/Proposals, as Well as the  




Purpose of Each Enacted Measure 
Arizona  2/8 establish redistricting commission; ban real-estate 
transfer tax 
Arkansas  2/5 ban same-sex marriage; authorize state lottery 
California  13/41 reduce percentage of popular vote needed to approve 
local school bond referendums; facilitate local 
governments’ ability to contract with architects and 
engineers; fund stem-cell research; limit eminent 
domain power; ban same-sex marriage; establish 
re-districting commission for state legislative 
districts; expand role of redistricting commission to 
apply to congressional districts; eliminate legislative 
supermajority requirement for passing appropriations 
bills; extend current legislative supermajority 
requirement for tax increases to cover fee increases; 
limit state’s ability to use local revenue for 
non-designated purposes; expand victims’ rights; 
increase sales tax and income tax rates; relax legis-
lative term limits 
Colorado  11/36 legalize medical marijuana; mandate annual increases 
 
 28 See id. 
 29 See infra Table 2. For historical data on use of the process by each state, up 
through the mid-1980s, see May, supra note 15, at 165. Patterns for twenty-first century 
constitutional-initiative use generally follow the patterns through the mid-1980s, in that 
California, Colorado, and Oregon are the top three states in proposals in both periods. See 
infra Table 2; May, supra note 15, at 165.  
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Purpose of Each Enacted Measure 
in school spending; limit campaign contributions and 
expenditures; increase cigarette tax; limit gifts to 
elected officials; increase minimum wage; ban 
same-sex marriage; allow longer hours and higher 
wagers at casinos; limit campaign contributions from 
groups contracting with state; legalize recreational 
marijuana; instruct congressional delegation to 
support federal campaign-finance amendment  
Florida  17/19 build high-speed rail system connecting major cities; 
limit confinement of pregnant pigs; ban workplace 
smoking; expand pre-K schooling; reduce K–12 class 
sizes; establish local board of trustees for each public 
university; repeal requirement to build high-speed rail 
system; limit contingency-fee arrangements in 
medical-malpractice cases; prevent licensing of doctors 
with three malpractice judgments; grant patient 
access to information about doctors’ adverse medical 
incidents; increase minimum wage; allow voters in 
two counties to approve slot machines at horse-racing 
tracks; require tobacco-settlement funds to be used for 
smoking prevention; ban same-sex marriage; bar con-
sideration of party and incumbency when drawing 
state legislative districts; bar consideration of party 
and incumbency when drawing congressional districts; 
dedicate proceeds from document tax to land 
acquisition trust fund 
Illinois  0/0 none 
Massachusetts  0/0 none 
Michigan  4/13 require voter approval for new forms of gambling; ban 
same-sex marriage; limit affirmative action; authorize 
stem-cell research 
Missouri  3/7 authorize stem-cell research; ban real-estate transfer 
tax; ensure gas tax only funds transportation 
programs 
Mississippi  2/3 impose voter ID requirement; limit eminent domain 
power 
Montana  2/2 ban same-sex marriage; ban real-estate transfer tax 
Nebraska  4/6 adopt legislative term limits; ban same-sex marriage; 
limit legislative modification of statutes passed 
through initiative process; limit affirmative action 
Nevada  5/9 legalize medical marijuana; ban same-sex marriage; 
increase minimum wage; limit eminent-domain power; 
require legislature to pass education appropriation bill 
before other appropriation bills 
North Dakota  4/7 authorize state to join multi-state lottery; ban 
same-sex marriage; limit eminent domain-power; 
guarantee right to farm 
Ohio  4/13 ban same-sex marriage; increase minimum wage; 
authorize casinos in four cities; bar enforcement of 
health-insurance mandate 
Oklahoma  0/2 none 
Oregon  9/27 establish commission to regulate home health-care; 
require legislature to fund schools adequately; limit 
civil-asset forfeiture; strengthen restrictions on paid 
signature-gatherers for initiatives; ban same-sex 
marriage; renew provision dedicating portion of 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:51 AM 




Purpose of Each Enacted Measure 
lottery revenue to environmental program; ban 
real-estate transfer tax; require excess revenue from 
corporate taxes to be placed in the general fund rather 
than refunded; ban unequal treatment on account of 
sex 
South Dakota  1/5 repeal inheritance tax 
C.  The Subjects of Constitutional Initiatives 
In surveying the subjects addressed via constitutional 
initiative processes from 2000–2014, several topics attracted 
particular attention. Tax and finance measures appeared 
regularly on state ballots. The constitutional initiative process 
was also a frequent vehicle for proposing and, in some cases, 
enacting measures regarding education and gambling. Although 
the following survey is not an exhaustive list—and other 
amendments will be noted in the following section—it might be 
useful in highlighting topics taken up on a regular basis.  
1. Taxes  
Voters approved six constitutional initiatives limiting taxes, 
while defeating a number of other tax-limit measures. On the 
approval list were a 2000 South Dakota amendment repealing 
the inheritance tax;30 a 2010 California amendment extending a 
two-thirds legislative-vote requirement for tax increases to also 
apply to fee increases;31 and bans on real-estate transfer taxes in 
Arizona in 2008,32 Missouri33 and Montana34 in 2010, and Oregon 
in 2012.35 As for defeated measures, voters rejected a number of 
general limits on taxing and/or spending inspired, in some 
fashion, by Colorado’s 1992 Taxpayers Bill of Rights (TABOR) 
 
 30 South Dakota Inheritance Tax, Amendment C (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/South_Dakota_Inheritance_Tax,_Amendment_C_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
Y94F-MLUM]. 
 31 California Proposition 26, Supermajority Vote to Pass New Taxes and Fees (2010), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_26,_Supermajority_Vote_to_ 
Pass_New_Taxes_and_Fees_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/4FHM-TSDZ]. 
 32 Arizona Protect Our Homes, Proposition 100 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Arizona_Protect_Our_Homes,_Proposition_100_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/7 
U72-R2A2]. 
 33 Missouri Real Estate Taxation, Amendment 3 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Missouri_Real_Estate_Taxation,_Amendment_3_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
U4PX-PTFJ]. 
 34 Montana New Property Tax Elimination, CI-105 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Montana_New_Property_Tax_Elimination,_CI-105_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
TF4W-GSXN]. 
 35 Oregon Real Estate Transfer Tax Amendment, Measure 79 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Real_Estate_Transfer_Tax_Amendment,_Measure_79_%28
2012%29 [http://perma.cc/U52E-JCYS]. 
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amendment,36 whether in Colorado37 and Oregon38 in 2000, 
Nebraska39 and Oregon40 in 2006, or Michigan in 2012.41 Several 
narrowly tailored tax-limitation amendments were also rejected, 
including a 2002 Arkansas measure eliminating taxes on food 
and medicine,42 a 2010 Colorado measure reducing property 
taxes,43 and a 2012 North Dakota measure eliminating property 
taxes.44  
Constitutional initiatives seeking to increase taxes were also 
prevalent, although the vast majority were rejected. A 2012 
California measure increasing the sales tax and the income tax 
on upper-income earners was the most prominent tax-increase 
measure enacted through the constitutional initiative process.45 
Voters generally defeated other constitutional initiatives 
increasing taxes and dedicating the revenue to particular 
purposes. Voters defeated measures in California, increasing 
telephone taxes to fund emergency rooms (in 2004),46 increasing 
income taxes on upper-income earners to fund pre-K schooling 
(in 2006),47 imposing a parcel tax on land to fund school spending 
 
 36  Colorado Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Initiative 1 (1992), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Colorado_Taxpayer_Bill_of_Rights,_Initiative_1_(1992) [http://perma.cc/TU7G-
964H]. 
 37 Colorado Tax Cuts, Initiative 21, BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colo 
rado_Tax_Cuts,_Initiative_21_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/P5BL-6HDP].  
 38 Oregon Limits on State Appropriations from Personal Income Tax, Measure 8 
(2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Limits_on_State_Appropriations_ 
from_Personal_Income_Tax,_Measure_8_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/AM3B-5VCH].  
 39 Nebraska State Spending Limit, Measure 423 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Nebraska_Spending_Limit_Amendment,_Initiative_Measure_423_%282006%29 
[http://perma.cc/ZR7S-2VRK].  
 40 Oregon Ballot Measure 48, State Government Spending Limits (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Ballot_Measure_48,_State_Government_Spending_Limits_
%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/K67G-N2TZ].  
 41 Michigan Taxation Amendment, Proposal 5 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Michigan_Taxation_Amendment,_Proposal_5_%282012%29 [http://perma.cc/7W 
MR-VQ6K].  
 42 Arkansas Taxes on Food and Medicine, Amendment 3 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Elimination_of_Taxes_on_Food_and_Medicine,_Amendment 
_3_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/PAG9-Y3WJ].  
 43 Colorado Property Taxes, Initiative 60 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Colorado_Property_Taxes,_Initiative_60_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/PT73-2QGU]. 
 44 North Dakota Property Tax Amendment, Measure 2 (June 2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Property_Tax_Amendment,_Measure_2_%28June_2
012%29 [http://perma.cc/8A3V-Q6ZY].  
 45 California Proposition 30, Sales and Income Tax Increase (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_30,_Sales_and_Income_Tax_Increase_%2820
12%29 [http://perma.cc/6DUQ-JSCR]. 
 46 California Proposition 67, Tax on Telephone Calls (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_67,_Tax_on_Telephone_Calls_%282004%29 
[http://perma.cc/RB8N-P9PP]. 
 47 California Proposition 82, Free Half-Day Public Preschool Program (June 2006), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_82,_Free_Half-Day_Public_Pre 
school_Program_%28June_2006%29 [http://perma.cc/7UJ3-6NZ5]. 
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(in 2006),48 and levying an oil severance tax to fund alternative 
energy programs (in 2006).49 Other defeated constitutional 
initiatives took similar approaches, as in Colorado, where voters 
in 2008 turned back a series of measures that would have 
increased the sales tax to fund programs for the developmentally 
disabled,50 used revenue from an existing severance tax to create 
a highway trust fund,51 and eliminated TABOR-mandated 
refunds of tax revenue and dedicated the money to schools 
instead.52 Colorado voters in 2013 also rejected a measure 
increasing income taxes to fund schools.53  
2. Education  
Education-related measures were also prevalent. Along with 
various tax measures dedicating tax revenue to schools, voters 
also encountered—and in a handful of instances approved—
several other school-related measures, most of which sought to 
boost spending or expand programs. Most importantly, Colorado 
voters in 2000 approved Initiative 23, which required funding for 
schools to increase by at least the rate of inflation plus one 
percentage point for each of the next ten years, and by at least 
the rate of inflation for each year thereafter.54 Oregon voters in 
2000 approved a measure altering the education clause to require 
the state to provide adequate funding for school “quality goals.”55 
Florida voters in 2002 approved a pair of education 
amendments: one established pre-K schooling56 and the other set 
 
 48 California Proposition 88, Statewide $50 Parcel Tax (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_88,_Statewide_$50_Parcel_Tax_%282006%29 
[http://perma.cc/B5UW-92TW]. 
 49 California Proposition 87, Alternative Energy Oil Tax (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_87,_Alternative_Energy_Oil_Tax_%282006%
29 [http://perma.cc/DU6W-NX6H]. 
 50 Colorado Sales Tax for Developmentally Disabled, Initiative 51 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Sales_Tax_for_Developmentally_Disabled,_ 
Initiative_51_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/D3AB-YY3J]. 
 51 Colorado Severance Tax Revenue for Highways, Initiative 52 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Severance_Tax_Revenue_for_Highways,_Initiative_52_%2
82008%29 [http://perma.cc/6RUV-45AP]. 
 52 Colorado Education Funding and TABOR Rebates, Initiative 59, BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Education_Funding_and_TABOR_Rebates,_Initiative_59_
%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/LN49-HX2W]. 
 53 Colorado Tax Increase for Education, Amendment 66 (2013), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Tax_Increase_for_Education,_Amendment_66_%282013%
29 [http://perma.cc/V9W7-PS7X]. 
 54 Colorado Funding for Public Schools, Initiative 23 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Funding_for_Public_Schools,_Initiative_23_%282000%29 
[http://perma.cc/F63J-XKRG].  
 55 Oregon Public School Funding and Equalization, Measure 1 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Public_School_Funding_and_Equalization,_Measure_1_%28
2000%29 [http://perma.cc/2P9P-8KVS].  
 56 Florida Universal Pre-Kindergarten, Amendment 8 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Universal_Pre-Kindergarten,_Amendment_8_%282002%29 
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maximum K–12 class sizes.57 A Nevada amendment had a 
different aim. In response to a complex state supreme court 
decision, Guinn v. Legislature of Nevada,58 Nevada voters gave 
final approval in 2006 to an “education first” amendment, 
requiring the legislature to pass an education appropriations bill 
before approving any other appropriations bills.59  
Voters also rejected a sizable number of education-related 
constitutional initiatives. Voters in Nevada in 200460 and in 
Oklahoma in 201061 rejected measures requiring K–12 per-pupil 
spending to be at least as high as the average of other states, 
whether all states (as in the Nevada measure) or neighboring 
states (as in the Oklahoma proposal). Vouchers for students 
attending private schools were rejected in California62 and 
Michigan63 in 2000, as were measures tying teacher pay to 
student learning outcomes in Oregon64 and Missouri (in 2014).65 
Colorado voters rejected measures requiring use of English in 
K−12 schools (in 2002)66 and requiring districts to spent at least 
65% of their budget on classroom learning (in 2006).67 
 
[http://perma.cc/5GN9-6X25]. 
 57 Florida Reduce Class Size, Amendment 9 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Reduce_Class_Size,_Amendment_9_%282002%29 [http://per 
ma.cc/PH96-YUXP]. 
 58 Guinn v. Legislature of Nev., 71 P.3d 1269 (Nev. 2003), overruled by Nevadans for 
Nev. v. Beers, 142 P.3d 339 (Nev. 2006).  
 59 Nevada Fund Education First, Question 1 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia. 
org/Nevada_Fund_Education_First,_Question_1_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/HL5D-2L8K]. 
 60 Nevada Per Pupil Expenditure, Question 2 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Nevada_Per_Pupil_Expenditure,_Question_2_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/D3 
Q3-UN59]. 
 61 Oklahoma State Funds for Common Schools, State Question 744 (2010), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_State_Funds_for_Common_Schools,_State 
_Question_744_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/CEE5-ZB3Z]. 
 62 California Proposition 38, School Vouchers (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/California_Proposition_38,_School_Vouchers_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/G66 
R-NPTC]. 
 63 Michigan Vouchers and Teacher Testing Amendment, Proposal 1 (2000), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Vouchers_and_Teacher_Testing_Amendment, 
_Proposal_1_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/PKD8-NFF4]. 
 64 Oregon Teacher Pay Determined by Student Learning, Measure 95 (2000), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Teacher_Pay_Determined_by_Student_Learn 
ing,_Measure_95_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/4KVP-UFMT]. 
 65 Missouri Teacher Performance Evaluation, Amendment 3 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Teacher_Performance_Evaluation,_Amendment_3_%2820
14%29 [http://perma.cc/QAH2-NQG6]. 
 66 Colorado English Language Education, Initiative 31 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_English_Language_Education,_Initiative_31_%282002%29 
[http://perma.cc/4RTA-BSEX]. 
 67 Colorado School District Spending Requirements, Initiative 39 (2006), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_School_District_Spending_Requirements,_ 
Initiative_39_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/RQ98-V32G]. 
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3. Gambling 
Gambling measures figured prominently on state ballots. On 
rare occasions, constitutional initiatives sought to limit 
gambling, as with a voter-approved measure in Michigan in 2004 
requiring voter approval for most new forms of gambling68 and a 
voter-rejected measure in South Dakota in 2000 disallowing 
video lottery games.69 
For the most part, constitutional initiatives sought to 
authorize or expand gambling. Voters approved several 
gambling-expansion amendments: North Dakota voters in 2002 
allowed the state to join a multi-state lottery;70 Florida voters in 
2004 authorized residents of two counties to vote on approving 
slot machines at horse-racing tracks;71 Colorado voters in 2008 
approved an amendment allowing extended hours at casinos and 
higher limits on wagers;72 and Arkansas voters in 2008 
authorized a state lottery.73 An amendment approved by Ohio 
voters in 2009 authorized construction of four casinos and 
designated their particular locations.74  
Voters rejected other gambling-expansion measures. They 
turned back measures to implement video lottery games 
(in Colorado in 2003),75 allow floating gambling facilities 
(in Missouri in 2004),76 expand allowable slot machines (in Ohio 
in 2006),77 authorize a casino in the southwest part of the state 
 
 68 Michigan Gambling Outlets Amendment, Proposal 1 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Gambling_Outlets_Amendment,_Proposal_1_%282004%29 
[http://perma.cc/XMQ7-472V]. 
 69 South Dakota Repeal Video Lottery, Amendment D (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/South_Dakota_Repeal_Video_Lottery,_Amendment_D_%282000%29 
[http://perma.cc/92MZ-CBZ5]. 
 70 North Dakota Multi-State Lottery, Initiated Constitutional Measure 2 (2002), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Multi-State_Lottery,_Initiated_Consti 
tutional_Measure_2_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/7JJP-EE7H]. 
 71 Florida Slot Machines, Amendment 4 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Florida_Slot_Machines,_Amendment_4_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/Z2HX-BR45]. 
 72 Colorado Limited Gaming in Central City, Black Hawk and Cripple Creek, 
Initiative 50 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Limited_Gaming_in_ 
Central_City,_Black_Hawk_and_Cripple_Creek,_Initiative_50_%282008%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/XN5K-26TH]. 
 73 Arkansas State Lottery, Proposed Constitutional Amendment 3 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_State_Lottery,_Proposed_Constitutional_ 
Amendment_3_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/62Z2-LE8L]. 
 74 Ohio Casino Approval and Tax Distribution, Amendment 3 (2009), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Casino_Initiative,_Issue_3_%282009%29 [http://perma.cc/E27 
4-XB2E]. 
 75 Colorado Video Lottery and Tourism Promotion, Initiative 33 (2003), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Video_Lottery_and_Tourism_Promotion,_Initiative_33_%2
82003%29 [http://perma.cc/C8F7-GFA7]. 
 76 Missouri Floating Gambling Facilities, Amendment 1 (August 2004), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Floating_Gambling_Facilities,_Amendment_1_%28August
_2004%29 [http://perma.cc/Q36H-6KBV]. 
 77 Ohio Casino Gambling, Amendment 3 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
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(in Ohio in 2008),78 authorize private casinos (in Oregon in 
2012),79 and expand gambling at horse-tracks (in Colorado in 
2014).80 California voters in 2004 rejected a pair of measures that 
would have facilitated negotiation of tribal gaming compacts.81 
4. Tobacco  
Constitutional initiatives were, on various occasions, a 
vehicle for increasing cigarette taxes or regulating smoking, 
although most of these measures were defeated. Voters in 
Colorado approved a 2004 amendment increasing the cigarette 
tax,82 but cigarette-tax hikes were defeated in Missouri83 and 
California84 in 2006. Meanwhile, voters in Florida approved a 
2002 amendment banning “smoking in enclosed indoor 
workplaces,”85 but Ohio voters in 2006 turned back a 
tobacco-company backed amendment that would have overturned 
local public-smoking bans in favor of a statewide public-smoking 
policy.86 Additionally, voters in Florida in 2006 approved an 
amendment requiring the state to reserve funds received as part 
of a legal settlement between the state and tobacco companies 
solely for smoking-prevention programs,87 but Michigan voters in 
 
Ohio_Casino_Gambling,_Amendment_3_(2006) [http://perma.cc/K9DC-V99Y]. 
 78 Ohio Casino Approval and Tax Distribution, Amendment 6 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Casino_Approval_and_Tax_Distribution,_Amendment_6_(2008) 
[http://perma.cc/H2FY-H6RH]. 
 79 Oregon Privately-Owned Casinos Amendment, Measure 82 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Privately-Owned_Casinos_Amendment,_Measure_82_%282 
012%29 [http://perma.cc/LKU5-W598]. 
 80 Colorado Horse Racetrack Limited Gaming Proceeds for K-12 Education, 
Amendment 68 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Horse_Racetrack_ 
Limited_Gaming_Proceeds_for_K-12_Education,_Amendment_68_%282014%29 [http://per 
ma.cc/U6PK-HB8C]. 
 81 California Proposition 68, Tribal Gaming Compact Renegotiation (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_68,_Tribal_Gaming_Compact_ 
Renegotiation_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/FB5T-TY9C]; California Proposition 70, 
Tribal Gaming Compacts Amendment (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
California_Proposition_70,_Tribal_Gaming_Compacts_Amendment_%282004%29 [http://per 
ma.cc/9FLC-SRVK]. 
 82 Colorado Tobacco Tax Increase for Health-Related Purposes, Initiative 35 (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Tobacco_Tax_Increase_for_Health-Related_ 
Purposes,_Initiative_35_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/2QNN-3S48]. 
 83 Missouri Healthy Future Trust Fund, Amendment 3 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Missouri_Healthy_Future_Trust_Fund,_Amendment_3_%282006%29 
[http://perma.cc/E4F3-9DAL]. 
 84 California Proposition 86, Cigarette Taxes (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia. 
org/California_Proposition_86,_Cigarette_Taxes_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/BF8U-M4TN]. 
 85 Florida Prohibit Workplace Smoking, Amendment 6 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Prohibit_Workplace_Smoking,_Amendment_6_%282002%29 
[http://perma.cc/R7WP-24NC]. 
 86 Ohio Partial Smoking Ban, Amendment 4 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia. 
org/Ohio_Measure_4,_Partial_Smoking_Ban_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/353N-4N6R]. 
 87 Florida Amendment 4, Use of Tobacco Settlement Funds (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_4,_Use_of_Tobacco_Settlement_Funds_%2820
06%29 [http://perma.cc/ECK5-P7SR]. 
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2002 rejected an amendment specifying the purposes for which 
such funds could be used.88  
5. Labor Unions  
Constitutional initiatives restricting or expanding the rights 
of labor unions appeared with some regularity on state ballots. 
However, only one of these amendments was approved: a 2008 
Colorado amendment, later invalidated by the state supreme 
court,89 which would have had the effect of limiting labor unions’ 
ability to contribute to political campaigns.90 Voters rejected all 
other constitutional initiatives limiting unions. This included two 
other measures on the 2008 Colorado ballot, one that would have 
banned union-shop arrangements91 and another that would have 
barred payroll deductions for union dues,92 as well as a 2000 
Oregon measure that would have barred payroll deductions for 
political purposes without each worker’s express consent.93 
Constitutional initiatives seeking to expand collective-bargaining 
rights fared no better, as voters defeated amendments of this sort 
in Michigan94 and Missouri95 in 2002 and then again in Michigan 
in 2012.96  
6. Abortion  
Constitutional initiatives with implications for abortion 
appeared regularly on certain state ballots but were never 
 
 88 Michigan Relocation of Tobacco Revenue Amendment, Proposal 4 (2002), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Relocation_of_Tobacco_Revenue_Amend 
ment,_Proposal_4_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/SB9M-5FD9]. 
 89 Dallman v. Ritter, 225 P.3d 610 (Colo. 2010) (invalidating state constitutional 
amendment enacted by voter approval of Amendment 54 for violating the Federal 
Constitution). 
 90 Colorado Campaign Contributions from Government Contractors, Initiative 54 
(2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Campaign_Contributions_ from_Go 
vernment_Contractors,_Initiative_54_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/4HET-BYQW]. 
 91 Colorado Mandatory Labor Union Membership Prohibition, Initiative 47 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Mandatory_Labor_Union_Membership_Pro 
hibition,_Initiative_47_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/E4ZX-9M6G]. 
 92 Colorado Limitation on Public Payroll Deductions, Initiative 49 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Limitation_on_Public_Payroll_Deductions, 
_Initiative_49_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/TY2T-WE46]. 
 93 Oregon Prohibits Payroll Deductions for Political Purposes, Measure 92 (2000), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Prohibits_Payroll_Deductions_For _Political_ 
Purposes,_Measure_92_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/F5BY-LC83]. 
 94 Michigan Collective Bargaining Amendment, Proposal 3 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Collective_Bargaining_Amendment,_Proposal_3_%282002
%29 [http://perma.cc/K6A4-2PMW]. 
 95 Missouri Collective Bargaining, Amendment 2 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Missouri_Collective_Bargaining,_Amendment_2_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
2DMR-738G]. 
 96 Michigan “Protect Our Jobs” Amendment, Proposal 2 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_%22Protect_Our_Jobs%22_Amendment,_Proposal_2_%28
2012%29 [http://perma.cc/P2GK-Y9W3]. 
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approved by voters during this period. California voters rejected 
parental notification measures in 2005,97 2006,98 and 2008.99 
Additionally, voters in Colorado in 2008100 and 2010101 and in 
Mississippi in 2011102 defeated personhood amendments that 
generally defined life as beginning at conception and, in a way, 
intended to challenge U.S. Supreme Court precedent limiting 
state restrictions on abortion.103 Voters in Colorado in 2014 
defeated another personhood amendment that was more 
narrowly tailored, in that it sought to define fetuses as persons 
for purposes of the state criminal code and wrongful death act.104  
II. CONSEQUENCES OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL  
INITIATIVES FOR GOVERNANCE 
The benefit of compiling a record of citizen-initiated 
amendments enacted between 2000 and 2014 is to be able to test 
various claims about the consequences of constitutional initiative 
processes. On one hand, they are said to facilitate passage of 
institutional reforms at odds with the interests of public 
officials105 and secure passage of policies blocked due to 
legislative unresponsiveness or interest-group opposition.106 At 
the same time, they are said to limit policy flexibility107 and 
 
 97 California Proposition 73, Parental Notification for Minor’s Abortion (2005), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_73,_Parental_Notification_for 
_Minor%27s_Abortion_%282005%29 [http://perma.cc/VT59-EPEC]. 
 98 California Proposition 85, Parental Notification for Minor’s Abortion (2006), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_85,_Parental_Notification_for 
_Minor%27s_Abortion_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/2NYE-AT5G]. 
 99 California Proposition 4, Parental Notification for Minor’s Abortion (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_4,_Parental_Notification_for_ 
Minor%27s_Abortion_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/W2BA-F2KT]. 
 100 Colorado Definition of Person, Initiative 48 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Colorado_Definition_of_Person,_Initiative_48_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/GC 
8G-QKSF]. 
 101 Colorado Fetal Personhood, Initiative 62 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Colorado_Fetal_Personhood,_Initiative_62_(2010) [http://perma.cc/8EKS-4E99]. 
 102 Mississippi Life Begins at the Moment of Fertilization Amendment, Initiative 26 
(2011), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Life_Begins_at_the_Moment_of_ 
Fertilization_Amendment,_Initiative_26_%282011%29 [http://perma.cc/C3CX-8WMZ]. 
 103 See Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2011, supra note 21, at 5 
(“Personhood amendments have been proposed in several states in recent years, with 
supporters viewing them as a means of creating a conflict between state and federal law 
and thereby helping to generate a legal challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence, in the hopes that a majority of justices might be open to modifying prior 
precedents.”). 
 104 Colorado Definition of “Personhood” Initiative, Amendment 67 (2014), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Definition_of_%22Personhood%22_Initiative, 
_Amendment_67_%282014%29 [http://perma.cc/KXP7-E89T]. 
 105 See Cooper, supra note 15, at 233–34. 
 106 See id. at 234–36. 
 107 Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process: A Proposal to 
Increase Flexibility and Legislative Accountability, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN 
CALIFORNIA: MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 291, 298–99 
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restrict minority rights.108 However, few empirical analyses have 
assessed these claims in a systematic fashion across the full set 
of states.109 
Janice C. May’s 1988 study of constitutional initiative use 
through the mid-1980s is the most comprehensive analysis to 
date. Although ostensibly focused primarily on the consequences 
for the protection of rights, May’s study of the 628 proposed and 
221 adopted constitutional initiatives from 1906–1986 was 
actually much broader and took note of some effects on 
government institutions and processes.110  
My purpose is to conduct an empirical analysis of the kind 
undertaken by May. As she wrote, referring in particular to the 
claim—which she concluded was only partly supported—that the 
constitutional initiative threatens rights: 
After eighty years of experience with the constitutional initiative, a 
record exists on which to make an informed judgment about such a 
serious charge. The record consists of initiative proposals and 
adoptions from the time of the first initiative proposal in 1906 to the 
present. Although questions may always be raised about the data, the 
compilation of statewide initiatives provides essential information 
about the number and general categories, as well as the specific 
content of propositions.111  
My aim is to follow May’s approach by making use of data from 
twenty-first century constitutional-initiative adoptions to assess 
the degree of support for the leading claims about consequences 
for governance. 
 
(Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995).  
 108 See James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to 
State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 69 (1983). 
 109 There are, to be sure, additional claims that I am not able to address based on the 
evidentiary record I have compiled. For instance, much attention has been paid in recent 
years to the question of whether ballot measures boost voter turnout and, therefore, have 
the capacity to affect the results of other elections on the ballot. A full assessment would 
require examining voter turnout records and in a way that goes beyond the focus of this 
study. In general, scholars have concluded that certain types of initiated measures can 
boost turnout, especially in midterm elections and occasionally in presidential elections. 
See, e.g., DANIEL R. BIGGERS, MORALITY AT THE BALLOT: DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND 
POLITICAL ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 88–89 (2014). Perhaps most important, in 
a claim subjected to scrutiny elsewhere, critics express concern that the constitutional 
initiative process enables well-financed groups to prevail over the public interest. A full 
assessment would require examining the campaign-finance records for each of the 
citizen-initiated amendments from 2000–2014 and, therefore, would go beyond an 
analysis of the purpose and effects of these amendments, which is the focus of this study. 
For two leading studies, see generally GERBER, supra note 14, and MATSUSAKA, supra 
note 14. The dominant view in the literature is that well-financed groups can succeed in 
blocking passage of measures backed by a popular majority but are rarely able to secure 
passage of measures in their favor. GERBER, supra note 14, at 138–39.  
 110 May, supra note 15, at 165.  
 111 Id. at 164, 167.  
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A.  Bypassing Self-Interested Legislators 
Constitutional initiative processes have been touted as 
beneficial, in part, because they facilitate adoption of 
governmental reforms targeting legislators’ interests or 
prerogatives. As Delos Wilcox, a Progressive-era champion of 
direct democracy, argued in a 1912 book, Government by All the 
People:  
By what right of reason can we expect a partisan legislature to 
consent to the establishment of a non-partisan legislative 
ballot? . . . How can we appeal to a state legislature to divest itself of 
the powers of interference in municipal affairs? How can legislators 
and aldermen be expected to forbid themselves to use railroad 
passes?112  
Prior studies of twentieth century constitutional initiatives have 
found evidence that the process was indeed a vehicle for adopting 
political reforms of this kind.113 Meanwhile, in her study of the 
twentieth century record, May found evidence that the process 
was a vehicle for adopting reforms of this kind, including 
“Nebraska’s unicameral legislature, Missouri’s merit selection of 
judges, Illinois’ reduction in the size of the lower house of the 
state legislature and the substitution of single-member districts 
for the unique cumulative voting system, Florida’s ‘sunshine 
amendment’ on ethics and financial disclosure, Ohio’s county 
home rule amendment, and countless others.”114 
The twenty-first century record demonstrates that the 
constitutional initiative process continues to perform this 
function on a regular basis. Several structural reforms adopted 
via the constitutional initiative process would likely not have 
been enacted in the absence of such a process. The particular 
reforms adopted in the twenty-first century differ in some 
respects from reforms enacted in earlier decades. But the 
common theme is the reliance on constitutional initiative 
processes to enact reforms opposed by legislators who view them 
as a threat to their tenure in office, prerogatives, or powers.  
Legislative term limits present the clearest case of a 
measure adopted on a regular basis through the constitutional 
initiative process and rarely enacted through other 
mechanisms.115 Of the fifteen states that currently limit the 
number of terms state legislators can serve, all but two did so 
 
 112 DELOS F. WILCOX, GOVERNMENT BY ALL THE PEOPLE: THE INITIATIVE, THE 
REFERENDUM AND THE RECALL AS INSTRUMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 118 (Da Capo Press 1972) 
(1912). 
 113 See, e.g., SCHMIDT, supra note 14, at 15. 
 114 May, supra note 15, at 179.  
 115 MILLER, supra note 14, at 162. 
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through the constitutional initiative process.116 The exceptions 
are Maine, where terms limits were adopted via the statutory 
initiative process in 1993,117 and Louisiana, which is the truly 
exceptional case because term limits were adopted via a 
legislature-referred amendment in 1995.118 In all other states 
where legislative terms are currently limited, citizen-initiated 
amendments were the means of accomplishing this goal and 
overcoming legislative resistance, beginning in 1990 with 
passage of term-limits amendments in California, Colorado, and 
Oklahoma, and concluding in 2000 with Nebraska,119 the one 
occasion when a measure enacting legislative term limits was 
adopted during the 2000–2014 period covered by this study.120 
The constitutional initiative process also played a key role 
during the twenty-first century in adopting limits on drawing 
congressional and state legislative districts. To be sure, on 
several occasions in prior years, legislatures were willing to cede 
responsibility for line-drawing by referring for voter approval 
amendments establishing redistricting commissions.121 For the 
most part, however, legislators have been reluctant to part with 
this responsibility, such that during the twenty-first century, the 
principal redistricting reform measures have been adopted via 
the constitutional initiative process, generally in the face of 
legislative resistance.122 A 2000 Arizona constitutional initiative 
established an independent commission to re-draw congressional 
and state legislative districts.123 California voters resorted to the 
constitutional initiative process for this purpose on two 
 
 116 Id. at 163. 
  117 Maine State Official Term Limits, Question 1 (1993), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Maine_State_Official_Term_Limits,_Question_1_%281993%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
VHS7-BZWR]. 
 118 MILLER, supra note 14, at 162 n.28. 
 119 Id. at 163. 
 120 It should be noted that on one occasion during this 2000–2014 period, in 
California in 2012, the constitutional initiative was a vehicle for relaxing legislative term 
limits. California Proposition 28, Change in Term Limits (June 2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_28,_Change_in_Term_Limits_%28June_2012
%29 [http://perma.cc/KAN8-3639]. 
 121 In the twentieth century, Washington, Montana, and Idaho adopted independent 
redistricting commissions via legislature-referred constitutional amendments. Dinan, 
supra note 8, at 187.  
 122 Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: Why Popular Initiatives to 
Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & POL. 331, 332, 388–89 
(2007). One exception is a 2014 legislature-referred amendment in New York establishing 
a commission, but it fell short of an independent commission. New York Redistricting 
Commission Amendment, Proposal 1 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/New_ 
York_Redistricting_Commission_Amendment,_Proposal_1_%282014%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
4H4U-8Q3N]. 
  123 Arizona Creation of a Redistricting Commission, Proposition 106 (2000), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Creation_of_a_Redistricting_Commission,_ 
Proposition_106_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/8L7Y-826D].  
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occasions—first in 2008 to establish a commission to draw state 
legislative districts124 and then in 2010 to add congressional 
districting to the commission’s charge.125 Florida voters took a 
different approach. A pair of citizen-initiated amendments, 
approved in 2010, permitted legislators to retain control over 
redistricting but restricted their ability to consider partisanship 
or incumbency in drawing legislative126 and congressional127 
districts. 
On two occasions in the twenty-first century, voters 
approved citizen-initiated amendments imposing campaign 
finance or lobbying restrictions in ways that threatened 
legislators’ tenure or prerogatives. The connection between 
passage of campaign finance and ethics reforms and the 
availability of constitutional initiative processes is not quite as 
strong as in the case of term-limits and redistricting reform. 
Legislatures have been willing to limit the campaign donations 
or gifts they can receive in a way that they have been invariably 
opposed to do when it comes to limiting their own terms and 
generally reluctant to do when it comes to ceding control of 
drawing the districts in which they run for office.128 Nevertheless, 
the constitutional initiative process has been essential for 
enacting campaign finance restrictions in several instances in 
Colorado—including passage of campaign finance and disclosure 
rules in 2002,129 and passage of a strict ban on gifts to elected 
officials and creation of an ethics commission in 2006.130 The 
2002 Colorado measure is of particular interest. Colorado voters 
initially enacted a package of campaign-finance restrictions via 
the statutory initiative process in 1996, only to watch as 
 
  124 California Proposition 11, Creation of the California Citizens Redistricting 
Commission (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_11,_Crea 
tion_of_the_California_Citizens_Redistricting_Commission_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
JJ4S-YLNC].  
  125 California Proposition 20, Congressional Redistricting (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_20,_Congressional_Redistricting_%282010%
29 [http://perma.cc/EV2T-HTYQ]. 
  126 Florida Legislative District Boundaries, Amendment 5 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Legislative_District_Boundaries,_Amendment_5_%282010
%29 [http://perma.cc/XE7D-3CCL]. 
  127 Florida Congressional District Boundaries, Amendment 6 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Congressional_District_Boundaries,_Amendment_6_%2820
10%29 [http://perma.cc/82BA-RLD2]. 
 128 Legislator Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/37LP-YGQC]. 
 129 Colorado Campaign Finance, Initiative 27 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Colorado_Campaign_Finance,_Initiative_27_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/D2N 
J-GQT2].  
  130 Colorado Standards of Conduct in Government, Initiative 41 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Standards_of_Conduct_in_Government,_Initiative_41_%2
82006%29 [http://perma.cc/2MFS-VCJG]. 
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legislators “‘gutted’ the statutory campaign finance reforms in 
2000.”131 At that point, voters turned to the constitutional 
initiative process and reenacted a number of these reforms on a 
constitutional basis, with an eye toward preventing further 
legislative interference.132 
In each of the preceding cases, voters resorted to 
constitutional initiatives to overcome resistance rooted in 
legislators’ concern about their careers or the perks of office, but 
the process is also used to overcome legislative resistance to 
ceding institutional power. On various occasions in prior years, 
constitutional initiatives have been a vehicle for reducing 
legislative control over local government powers and policies, at 
times by adopting home-rule provisions.133 The one twenty-first 
century occasion when voters approved a constitutional initiative 
of this sort occurred with passage of a 2010 California 
amendment preventing the state from delaying distribution of 
tax revenue designated for distribution to local governments.134  
To conclude that the constitutional initiative process has 
played a notable role in securing passage of governmental 
reforms in the face of legislative resistance, as is evident from a 
review of term-limits, redistricting, campaign-finance, and 
home-rule measures, is not to pass judgment on the wisdom of 
these measures. Reasonable persons can disagree about whether 
and to what extent they are effective in accomplishing their 
intended goals. The point is that the record of twenty-first 
century citizen-initiated amendments provides strong support for 
claims that constitutional initiative processes facilitate passage 
of structural changes that would otherwise fail to pass.  
B.  Overcoming Unresponsive Legislatures 
Another claim about the effects of constitutional initiative 
processes is that they secure passage of policies blocked due to 
 
 131 Anne G. Campbell, Direct Democracy and Constitutional Reform: Campaign 
Finance Initiatives in Colorado, in 1 STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY: THE POLITICS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 175, 180, 182 (G. Alan Tarr 
& Robert F. Williams eds., 2006). 
 132 Dinan, supra note 8, at 191–92. 
 133 SCHMIDT, supra note 14, at 15 (noting the use of initiatives to adopt “home rule for 
municipalities” in Colorado and Oregon). On passage of a 1906 citizen-initiated 
amendment in Oregon, see Oregon Power to Amend City and Town Charters, Measure 6 
(June 1906), BALLOTPEDIA,  http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Power_to_Amend_City_and_ 
Town_Charters,_Measure_6_%28June_1906%29 [http://perma.cc/G4KW-4X9K]. On passage 
of a 1912 citizen-initiated amendment in Colorado, see Colorado Home Rule for Cities and 
Towns, Measure 8 (1912), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Home_Rule_for_ 
Cities_and_Towns,_Measure_8_%281912%29 [http://perma.cc/LM76-P5WF].  
 134 California Proposition 22, Ban on State Borrowing from Local Governments 
(2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_22,_Ban_on_State_Bor 
rowing_from_Local_Governments_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/2Q5K-BTJA]. 
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legislative unresponsiveness, on account of a disconnect between 
legislators’ and citizens’ preferences or interest-group influence 
in the legislative process. This claim figured prominently in 
Progressive-era debates surrounding adoption of the 
constitutional initiative process, as when Lawton Hemans, 
delegate to the Michigan Constitutional Convention of 
1907−1908, argued that legislatures were sometimes unduly 
influenced by powerful groups that prevented passage of policies 
with broad popular support:  
When the contest comes between the great commercial and industrial 
interests, and what might be termed the popular interest, then too 
often the great commercial interests by reason of their great strength, 
as compared with the numerical strength of the constituency, exercise 
a preponderating influence upon the minds of the legislature.135   
The intent of providing for the constitutional initiative process 
was in part to overcome these obstacles and interests. 
The twenty-first century record provides ample support for 
claims that the constitutional initiative process can at times 
secure passage of policies that would otherwise have been 
blocked or delayed. However, it is important to be clear about 
what the evidence demonstrates. In most cases where voters 
resorted to the constitutional initiative process to secure passage 
of policy reforms and prevent future legislative interference with 
them, legislatures in other states were enacting these same 
policies. Therefore, for the most part, the evidence does not point 
to universal failings of the legislative process in terms of an 
inability to respond to voter preferences, but rather supports a 
more modest conclusion. In some states and in some 
circumstances, constitutional initiatives played a role in securing 
speedy enactment of policies.  
The constitutional initiative process is occasionally a vehicle 
for enacting policies opposed by influential groups. On two 
occasions in the twenty-first century, voters approved 
citizen-initiated amendments opposed by tobacco companies. In 
Florida, which provides for the constitutional initiative process 
but does not allow statutory initiatives, voters resorted to the 
constitutional initiative process in 2002 to enact a ban on 
workplace smoking.136 In addition, in Colorado, which provides 
for the constitutional and statutory initiative process and sets 
similar requirements for qualifying measures for the ballot under 
 
 135 See JOSEPH H. BREWER, CHAS H. BENDER, & CHAS H. MCGURRIN, PROCEEDINGS 
AND DEBATES OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN 592 
(1908). 
 136 Florida Prohibit Workplace Smoking, Amendment 6 (2002), supra note 85. 
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both processes, voters approved a 2004 constitutional initiative 
increasing the cigarette tax by sixty-four cents a pack.137  
On other occasions, constitutional initiative processes have 
been a vehicle to overcome doctors’ groups seen as particularly 
influential in the legislative process. Florida voters in 2004 
approved two constitutional initiatives imposing restrictions on 
doctors. One measure denies medical licenses to doctors with 
three or more malpractice judgments.138 Another grants patients 
access to information about doctors’ adverse medical incidents.139  
In weighing the importance of the constitutional initiative 
process for overcoming group influence in the legislative process, 
however, it is important to note that legislatures in other states 
were generally enacting the same policies. This includes 
legislation restricting smoking in the workplace and other public 
places,140 as well as increasing cigarette taxes by significant 
amounts and on a regular basis.141 The one policy with no 
counterpart in statutes or legislature-referred amendments in 
other states—and the chief piece of evidence in favor of the 
group-bypassing function of constitutional initiatives—is the 
passage of Florida’s three-strike medical-malpractice amendment, 
which is stricter than any physician-related measure enacted by 
a state legislature.142 
The twenty-first century record provides somewhat more 
support for claims that the constitutional initiative process can 
overcome legislative unresponsiveness to citizen preferences. On 
several matters from 2000 to 2014—namely marijuana 
legalization, stem-cell research, minimum-wage hikes, and 
eminent domain limits—voters in multiple states resorted to 
constitutional initiatives to secure speedy passage of a policy 
change. In each instance, it should be stressed, legislative 
statutes and legislature-referred constitutional amendments 
 
 137 Colorado Tobacco Tax Increase for Health-Related Purposes, Initiative 35 (2004), 
supra note 82. 
 138 Florida Medical Malpractice Protection, Amendment 8 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Medical_Malpractice_Protection,_Amendment_8_%282004
%29 [http://perma.cc/U9U3-8QG8]. 
 139 Florida Patient’s Right to Know, Amendment 7 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Florida_Patient%27s_Right_to_Know,_Amendment_7_%282004%29 [http://per 
ma.cc/98P6-PTKV]. 
 140 State Smoke-Free Laws and Health, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/enacted-indoor-smoke-free-laws.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
RLZ2-NNF7] (last updated Feb. 2013).  
 141 State Cigarette Excise Taxes: 2011 and 2012, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/2011-state-cigarette-excise-taxes.aspx [http://perma.cc/ 
BB7Z-YM5D] (last updated Aug. 1, 2013). 
 142 See Florida Passes Three-Strikes Malpractice Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26, 2004), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/26/us/florida-passes-threestrikes-malpractice-law.html?_ 
r=0 [http://perma.cc/U4KB-NATH]. 
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were the vehicle for passing the same policy in other states. 
Nevertheless, legislatures were unresponsive to popular 
preferences on multiple occasions and in a way that was 
addressed through the constitutional initiative process.  
Marijuana legalization is the leading case. By 2015, 
twenty-three states had legalized medical marijuana and four 
had legalized recreational marijuana.143 Eleven of the 
twenty-three medical-marijuana legalization measures were 
enacted through the initiative process, generally through 
statutory initiatives but on two occasions—in Colorado and 
Nevada in 2000—through constitutional initiatives.144 
Meanwhile, all four states that legalized recreational marijuana 
have done so through the initiative process, and in one case—
Colorado in 2012—through a constitutional initiative.145 In short, 
legislatures have regularly been unresponsive to popular support 
for marijuana legalization measures, necessitating a resort to 
initiative processes to accomplish this goal. For the most part, 
the statutory initiative process was the method of choice. On 
three occasions, however, voters relied on constitutional 
initiatives for medical and recreational legalization measures. 
A disjunction between legislators’ and citizens’ preferences 
was also evident regarding support for embryonic stem-cell 
research and addressed at times through passage of 
constitutional initiatives.146 In some states, to be sure, 
legislatures enacted statutes authorizing and funding research in 
this area.147 But some legislatures were unwilling to fund or 
 
 143 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 [http://perma. 
cc/3YGU-7AQD] (last updated July 7, 2015, 4:32 PM) (listing the twenty-three states that 
have passed medical marijuana policy); State Marijuana Laws Map, GOVERNING, 
http://www.governing.com/gov-data/state-marijuana-laws-map-medical-recreational.html 
[http://perma.cc/N6BE-6QLU] (last updated June 19, 2015). 
 144 Dinan, supra note 8, at 189 n.205 (noting the eleven states approving medical 
marijuana measures through the initiative process); 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States 
and DC, supra note 143 (listing the twenty-three states that have passed medical 
marijuana policy); State Marijuana Laws Map, supra note 143. 
 145 Alaska Marijuana Legalization, Ballot Measure 2 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http:// 
ballotpedia.org/Alaska_Marijuana_Legalization,_Ballot_Measure_2_(2014) [http://perma.cc/  
AN4R-B5LD]; Colorado Marijuana Legalization Initiative, Amendment 64 (2012), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative,_Amend 
ment_64_(2012) [http://perma.cc/MNV4-EUXL]; Oregon Legalized Marijuana Initiative, 
Measure 91 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Legalized_Marijuana_ 
Initiative,_Measure_91_(2014) [http://perma.cc/E6X8-9NH5]; Washington Marijuana 
Legalization and Regulation, Initiative 502 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Washington_Marijuana_Legalization_and_Regulation,_Initiative_502_(2012) [http://per 
ma.cc/EHQ4-WRDP]. 
 146 John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendment Processes and the Safeguards of 
American Federalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1007, 1020–21 (2011). 
 147 JUDITH A. JOHNSON & ERIN D. WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33524, STEM 
CELL RESEARCH: STATE INITIATIVES 2–4, 6–7 (2006).  
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authorize this type of research at a time when the public was 
supportive, necessitating a resort to the constitutional initiative 
process. California voters approved a 2004 amendment funding 
stem-cell research, at a time when the Legislature balked at 
providing the desired funding.148 Voters in Missouri (in 2006)149 
and Michigan (in 2008)150 approved constitutional initiatives in 
situations where legislatures had banned or were considering 
bans on stem-cell research.151 
Minimum-wage increases above the federal minimum level 
have generally been supported and enacted by legislatures,152 but 
on multiple occasions during the twenty-first century, advocates 
resorted to the initiative process, often because 
Republican-controlled legislatures opposed increases supported 
by a wide majority of voters.153 On seven occasions, the statutory 
initiative process was the chosen mechanism for raising the 
minimum wage.154 But in four states—Florida in 2004 and 
Colorado, Nevada, and Ohio in 2006—the minimum wage was 
increased and annual inflation adjustments mandated by 
constitutional initiatives.155 
Limits on the eminent domain power were also adopted on 
several occasions in the twenty-first century via the 
constitutional initiative process, in situations where legislatures 
were seen as insufficiently supportive of restrictions commanding 
broad popular support. In the wake of public backlash against 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2005 ruling in Kelo v. City of New 
London,156 that the Federal Takings Clause did not bar use of 
 
 148 California Proposition 71, Stem Cell Research (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/California_Proposition_71,_Stem_Cell_Research_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
WL7T-EKV8].  
 149 Missouri Stem Cell Research, Amendment 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Missouri_Stem_Cell_Research,_Amendment_2_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/A 
BB2-GJUS].  
 150 Michigan Stem Cell Amendment, Proposal 2 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Michigan_Stem_Cell_Amendment,_Proposal_2_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/A 
CR3-JY6M]. 
 151 Dinan, supra note 146, at 1021. 
 152 State Minimum Wages: 2015 Minimum Wage by State, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES (June 30, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-
minimum-wage-chart.aspx [http://perma.cc/GGX7-6CNV]. 
 153 J.B. Wogan, 4 Red States that May Raise the Minimum Wage, GOVERNING (April 
4, 2014), http://www.governing.com/news/headlines/gov-four-red-states-that-may-raise-
minimum-wage.html [http://perma.cc/A378-UPAV]. 
 154 In 2006, minimum-wage increases were achieved through initiated statutes in 
Arizona, Missouri, and Montana. Dinan, supra note 146, at 1018 n.68. In 2014, 
minimum-wage increases were passed through the statutory initiative process in Alaska, 
Arkansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota. 2014 Minimum Wage Ballot Measures, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employ 
ment/minimum-wage-ballot-measures.aspx [http://perma.cc/2ZRD-3LD3]. 
 155 Dinan, supra note 146, at 1018–19. 
 156 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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eminent domain to condemn land for economic-development 
purposes, a number of legislatures enacted statutes or approved 
constitutional amendments limiting situations when government 
can condemn private property or strengthening guarantees that 
must be followed in the eminent domain process.157 On several 
occasions, however, eminent domain limits restrictions were 
enacted through constitutional initiative processes, as with 
amendments in 2006 in North Dakota,158 in 2008 in Nevada,159 
and in 2011 in Mississippi,160 that generally provided stronger 
protection than measures passed through legislative statutes or 
legislature-referred amendments,161 as well as a less stringent 
2008 California amendment.162 
C.  Constraining Policy Flexibility 
Whereas supporters of the constitutional initiative process 
stress benefits such as overcoming legislative resistance and 
unresponsiveness, critics contend that constitutional initiatives 
tend to impose undue limits on legislative flexibility. In 
characterizing this claim, Elizabeth R. Gerber wrote: “opponents 
of the initiative argue that the use of initiatives reduces policy 
flexibility. By flexibility, I mean the ability of policy actors to 
alter legislation that has unintended consequences, that is poorly 
written, or that ceases to attract popular support.”163 In 
particular, Gerber cited, as have a number of other scholars, the 
consequences for California of citizen-initiated amendments in 
the 1970s and 1980s that “severely constrain[ed] the ability of 
state and local governments to raise taxes” and also 
“constrain[ed] the legislature’s flexibility by earmarking general 
fund revenues for narrowly specified purposes.”164 
In considering whether and to what extent this concern is 
borne out by the 2000–2014 record, it should be acknowledged 
 
 157 ILYA SOMIN, THE GRASPING HAND: KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON AND THE LIMITS 
OF EMINENT DOMAIN 2, 145 (2015). 
 158 North Dakota Taking of Private Property, Measure 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Taking_of_Private_Property,_Measure_2_%282006%
29 [http://perma.cc/FX2L-5TT8]. 
 159 Nevada Property Owner’s Bill of Rights Amendment, Question 2 (2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Nevada_Property_Owner%27s_Bill_of_Rights_Amend 
ment,_Question_2_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/Y92X-8WSG]. 
 160 Mississippi Eminent Domain Amendment, Initiative 31 (2011), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Mississippi_Eminent_Domain_Amendment,_Initiative_31_%282011
%29 [http://perma.cc/4B2H-GS2U]. 
 161 SOMIN, supra note 157, at 157, 160.  
 162 California Proposition 99, Rules Governing Eminent Domain (June 2008), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_99,_Rules_Governing_Emi 
nent_Domain_%28June_2008%29 [http://perma.cc/3THU-9ZLD]. 
 163 Gerber, supra note 14, at 298. 
 164 Id. at 291–92. 
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that objective criteria and standards are particularly lacking in 
this area. That is, the intended purpose of a number of 
constitutional provisions, whether generated by legislatures or 
the citizenry, is to constrain policy flexibility: to proscribe certain 
courses of action and prescribe others. The question, therefore, is 
not whether constitutional initiatives reduce policy flexibility, 
but—and Gerber’s framework is useful in pinpointing the 
concern—whether they impose undue constraints on 
policy-makers’ ability to respond to changing preferences and 
circumstances. 
By this standard, several twenty-first century constitutional 
initiatives lend support to critics’ concerns. There are, to be sure, 
other citizen-initiated amendments enacted during this period 
that limited policy flexibility. A 2010 Oregon amendment 
dedicating a certain portion of lottery revenue to an 
environmental program165 and a 2014 Florida amendment 
dedicating revenue from a document tax to a land acquisition 
trust fund both limited legislative discretion in allocating 
revenue.166 Similarly, the four amendments enacted between 
2008 and 2012 banning real-estate transfer taxes limit the 
potential revenue sources from which legislators could draw.167 
But none of these amendments have had the wide-ranging and 
occasionally unintended consequences of the kind seen with 
several other amendments that have generated varying degrees 
of concern.  
At times, twenty-first century citizen-initiated amendments 
have interacted with prior citizen-initiated amendments in such 
a way as to generate concerns about undue constraints on policy 
flexibility, as with a 2000 Colorado amendment requiring school 
spending to increase each year by the inflation rate plus 1% for 
the next ten years and by the rate of inflation each year 
afterward.168 This amendment followed the passage of Colorado’s 
TABOR amendment in 1992, which imposed caps on annual 
increases in spending and also limited the ability to raise 
revenue.169 The overall effect of these provisions—and this 
resembles in some ways the effects in California of certain 
constitutional initiatives limiting tax rates and increases and 
 
 165 Oregon Lottery Funds for Natural Resources Amendment, Measure 76 (2010), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Lottery_Funds_for_Natural_Resources_ 
Amendment,_Measure_76_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/8AWR-P6P5]. 
 166 Florida Water and Land Conservation Initiative, Amendment 1 (2014), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Water_and_Land_Conservation_Initiative,_ 
Amendment_1_%282014%29 [http://perma.cc/WS9V-AEVB]. 
 167 See supra notes 31–34. 
 168 Colorado Funding for Public Schools, Initiative 23 (2000), supra note 54. 
 169 Colorado Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Initiative 1 (1992), supra note 36. 
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other constitutional initiatives requiring a certain portion of the 
budget to be dedicated to school spending170—has been to 
constrain budgeting flexibility to a significant degree.171 
Another education-related measure, a 2002 Florida 
amendment limiting K–12 class sizes, has generated even more 
concern from the standpoint of policy inflexibility. The Florida 
measure specifies that kindergarten through third grade classes 
must be capped at eighteen students, classes from fourth through 
eighth grade can have no more than twenty-two students, and 
high-school classes are limited to twenty-five students. Approved 
by voters by a 52–48% margin, the measure generated significant 
opposition in subsequent years.172 Some public officials contend 
that the requirement prioritizes class-size goals to the detriment 
of other priorities.173 And some districts have been led to take 
steps that are not seen as improving educational outcomes.174 In 
fact, when voters in 2010 considered a legislature-referred 
constitutional amendment to ease these constitutional limits, 
they supported easing the class-size limits by a 54–46% margin.175 
However, an intervening change in Florida’s constitution 
required post-2006 amendments to secure support of 60% of 
voters,176 leading to the amendment’s defeat. These and other 
developments provide strong evidence that this 2002 amendment 
has unduly constrained policy flexibility, in a judgment shared by 
commentators and public officials across the political 
spectrum.177  
Two other twenty-first century constitutional initiatives—
one in Florida and another in Ohio—are also widely viewed as 
imposing undue constraints on policy flexibility to the extent that 
they generated subsequent amendments bringing about their 
 
 170 Dinan, supra note 11, at 29. 
 171 See, e.g., THERESE J. MCGUIRE & KIM S. RUEBEN, THE COLORADO REVENUE 
LIMIT: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TABOR 3 (2006), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/old/briefingpapers/172/bp172.pdf [http://perma.cc/GZ82-R9ZA] (noting that the ultimate 
result is “less revenue left for other categories of spending”).  
 172 Jeffrey S. Solochek & Kathleen McGrory, After a Dozen Years, Florida Class-Size 
Foes May Finally Prevail, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.miamiherald.com/ 
news/politics-government/article17583149.html [http://perma.cc/76EX-XXEP]; Rhema 
Thompson, Florida State Legislators Re-examine Class-Size Mandate, WJCT 
(Jan. 15, 2004), http://news.wjct.org/post/florida-state-legislators-re-examine-class-size-
mandate [http://perma.cc/VS5M-NRUC].  
 173 Solochek & McGrory, supra note 172. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Florida Class Size, Amendment 8 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Florida_Class_Size,_Amendment_8_%282010%29 [http://perma.cc/PSB6-T9BH]. 
 176 Florida Amendment 3, Supermajority Vote Required to Approve a Constitutional 
Amendment (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_Super 
majority_Vote_Required_to_Approve_a_Constitutional_Amendment_%282006%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/MGK2-KTUX]. 
 177 See Solochek & McGrory, supra note 172. 
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repeal or modification. In 2000, Florida voters approved a 
citizen-initiated amendment calling for construction of a 
high-speed rail system to “link the five largest urban areas of the 
State” and proclaiming: “The Legislature, the Cabinet and the 
Governor are hereby directed to proceed with the development of 
such a system by the State and/or by a private entity . . . with 
construction to begin on or before November 1, 2003.”178 
However, after the amendment’s approval by 53% of voters, 
critics expressed increasing concern about the cost, which was 
eventually calculated as amounting to at least $20 billion and 
perhaps more.179 In response, Florida voters in 2004 approved, by 
a 64–36% margin, a citizen-initiated amendment repealing the 
original amendment in its entirety.180  
No twenty-first century constitutional initiative has 
generated more concern about undue constraints on policy 
inflexibility than a 2009 Ohio amendment authorizing 
construction of casinos in four cities and going so far as to 
designate the precise location of each casino.181 For instance, the 
amendment designated that the Columbus casino—the 
descriptions of the sites for several of the other casinos are even 
longer—would be built in the following site: “Being an 
approximate 18.312 acre area in the city of Columbus, Franklin 
County, Ohio, as identified by the Franklin County Auditor, as of 
03/05/09, as tax parcel numbers 010-005518-80, 010-005518-90, 
010-020215-80, 010-020215-90, 010-008443-80 and 010-008443-
90.”182 As one indication of the undue constraints imposed by this 
constitutional initiative, shortly after it was approved by voters 
in November 2009, officials of Columbus and the surrounding 
Franklin County objected to the site of the planned Columbus 
casino.183 However, because the location was now enshrined in 
the text of the Ohio Constitution, it could not be changed merely 
by passage of a legislative statute. This change would have to be 
achieved by passage of another constitutional amendment 
 
 178 Florida Monorail, Amendment 1 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Florida_Monorail,_Amendment_1_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/CC23-NKBF]. 
 179 Jack Lyne, Derailed: Florida Amendment for $25B Bullet Train Bites Dust in Vote, 
SITE SELECTION (Nov. 8, 2004), http://www.siteselection.com/ssinsider/snapshot/sf041 
108.htm [http://perma.cc/E98S-W732]. 
 180 Florida High Speed Rail, Amendment 6 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Florida_High_Speed_Rail,_Amendment_6_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/9T2S-
CWKY].  
 181 Ohio Casino Approval and Tax Distribution, Amendment 3 (2009), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Casino_Approval_and_Tax_Distribution,_Amendment_3_(2009) 
[http://perma.cc/KKY9-JD9A]. 
 182 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 6. 
 183 See Jim Siegel, Ohioans Will Vote on Moving Columbus Casino, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Jan. 27, 2010, 3:33 PM), http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2010/ 
01/27/columbus-casino-issue-going-to-statewide-ballot.html [http://perma.cc/9KFP-4CS9]. 
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modifying the original amendment. To this end, the Legislature 
approved, and voters in a May 2010 election ratified, a 
legislature-referred constitutional amendment changing the site 
of the Columbus casino “from the area known as ‘The Arena 
District’ to the site of a former General Motors/Delphi Corp. 
manufacturing plant.”184  
In assessing the degree to which concerns about undue 
constraints on policy flexibility have ultimately been borne out, 
the twenty-first century record provides solid supporting 
evidence. To be sure, the number of constitutional initiatives 
generating these concerns between 2000 and 2014 is not high. 
Moreover, citizens and public officials have, in various ways, 
been able to overcome some of the constraints imposed by 
problematic measures by enacting subsequent citizen-initiated or 
legislature-referred amendments overturning or modifying the 
earlier amendment. However, in several instances, constraints on 
policy flexibility imposed via the constitutional initiative process 
have been significant and, at times, enduring. 
D.  Impairing Minority Rights 
None of the claims about the consequences of the 
constitutional initiative process has attracted more scholarly 
attention than the possibility that it facilitates passage of 
measures impairing individual rights. For the most part, scholars 
analyzing this question have focused on the broad question of the 
consequences of measures enacted through any direct democratic 
devices, whether on a statutory or constitutional basis.185 Janice 
May’s 1988 study is notable in that it focused specifically on the 
constitutional initiative.186 May drew several conclusions from 
the 1906–1986 record. She noted that, “[i]n view of the concern 
over the threat to liberty posed by the constitutional initiative, 
the fact that the device has been used to promote rights has been 
overlooked,”187 although on balance, “[t]here is considerable 
evidence that, although not numerous, more of the electorally 
successful constitutional initiatives have reduced rather than 
expanded rights.”188 Having offered this overall negative 
 
 184 Ohio Columbus Casino Relocation, Amendment 2 (May 2010), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Ohio_Columbus_Casino_Relocation,_Issue_2_%28May_2010%29 
[http://perma.cc/X7JC-CBFT]. 
 185 For some of the leading studies, see generally LEWIS, supra note 14; MILLER, 
supra note 14, at 124–56; Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public 
Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of 
Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a 
Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245 (1997).  
 186 See generally May, supra note 15. 
 187 Id. at 168.  
 188 Id. at 169. 
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assessment, May nevertheless stressed that the empirical record 
did not offer strong support for claims about the negative 
consequences for rights: “The prediction that the constitutional 
initiative would destroy rights and liberties has not been borne 
out, although it is true that a few proposals were designed to 
reduce rights.”189 Her ultimate conclusion was that the 
constitutional initiative process had its shortcomings, but these 
had to be understood in relation to the record of representative 
institutions.190 
The twenty-first century record provides little ground for 
modifying May’s assessment. In keeping with May’s observation 
about the passage of rights-protecting measures, several 
twenty-first century constitutional initiatives protect rights. The 
leading example is a 2014 Oregon amendment prohibiting 
unequal treatment on account of sex.191 One could also point to 
protections for property rights, including a 2000 Oregon 
amendment requiring a conviction before government officials 
can begin a civil-asset forfeiture proceeding,192 as well as eminent 
domain amendments protecting property rights in North Dakota 
in 2006, California and Nevada in 2008, and Mississippi in 
2011.193 Additionally—although this is a contested case that 
illustrates the challenges of categorizing measures as either 
rights-protecting or rights-impairing194—one could point to the 
passage of Marsy’s Law, a 2008 California citizen-initiated 
measure combining constitutional and statutory changes.195 On 
one hand, this measure extended protection for victims’ rights. 
On the other hand, a provision intended to help victims of 
crime—later invalidated by a federal district court—required 
longer wait times between parole hearings with the effect of 
limiting the rights of imprisoned persons.196 
As for passage of rights-impairing measures, an assessment 
of the 2000–2014 record would also generally follow May’s 
conclusion, in that voters on several occasions approved 
 
 189 Id. at 170. 
 190 Id. at 179. 
 191 Oregon Equal Rights for Women Initiative, Measure 89 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Equal_Rights_for_Women_Initiative,_Measure_89_%282014
%29 [http://perma.cc/ND5E-GPU7]. 
 192 Oregon Property Forfeiture Requirements, Measure 3 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Property_Forfeiture_Requirements,_Measure_3_%282000%
29 [http://perma.cc/YQ2Y-TQL8]. 
 193 See supra notes 158–60, 162. 
 194 For discussions of this challenge, see MILLER, supra note 14, at 124–25, 155, and 
May, supra note 15, at 168. 
 195 California Proposition 9, Marsy’s Law (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
California_Proposition_9,_Marsy%27s_Law_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/88Z3-2H6W]. 
 196 See Valdivia v. Brown, No. CIV. S–94–671 LKK/GGH, 2012 WL 219342, at *1, *5 
(E.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2012). 
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citizen-initiated amendments that were opposed by racial, ethnic, 
or gender minorities, but these amendments generally did not 
differ greatly from similar measures approved by legislatures. 
The main evidence for claims that constitutional initiative 
processes are more threatening to minority groups than 
processes requiring legislative participation comes from passage 
of citizen-initiated amendments limiting affirmative action in 
Michigan in 2006197 and Nebraska in 2008198 (voters in Colorado 
defeated a similar measure in 2008).199 Of course, reasonable 
persons can disagree about whether these measures might also 
be considered rights-protecting measures. Moreover, similarly 
framed measures were adopted through other processes—
through legislature-referred constitutional amendments in 
Arizona in 2010200 and Oklahoma in 2012201 and through a 
legislative statute passed in New Hampshire in 2011202 and an 
executive order issued in Florida in 1999.203 Nevertheless, when 
considering the pre- and post-2000 period, a full half of the 
measures limiting affirmative action have been approved 
through citizen-initiated measures, whether constitutional 
initiatives, as in California (1996), Michigan (2006), and 
Nebraska (2008), or statutory initiatives, as in Washington 
(1998).204 Additionally, several of the measures enacted through 
means other than the initiative process, as in Florida, were 
proposed in reaction to groups that were seeking support for 
constitutional initiatives limiting affirmative action, and, 
therefore, could be attributed indirectly to the availability of the 
constitutional initiative process.205  
Drawing lessons from the eleven citizen-initiated 
amendments barring recognition of same-sex marriage is more 
 
 197 Michigan Civil Rights Amendment, Proposal 2 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Michigan_Civil_Rights_Amendment,_Proposal_2_%282006%29 
[http://perma.cc/6LY5-B4EY].  
 198 Nebraska Civil Rights, Measure 424 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Nebraska_Civil_Rights_Initiative,_424_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/H6TA-26NN]. 
 199 Colorado Discrimination and Preferential Treatment by Governments, Initiative 46 
(2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Discrimination_and_Preferential_ 
Treatment_by_Governments,_Initiative_46_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/GB6F-C5HM]. 
 200 Affirmative Action: State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (April 2014), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx [http://perma. 
cc/P65V-LKVW]. The reliance on constitutional initiative processes to adopt the 
California, Michigan, and Nebraska measures is noted in Dinan, supra note 146, at 1017. 
The reliance on the statutory initiative process to adopt the Washington measure is noted 
in id. at 1017 n.58. 
 201 Affirmative Action: State Action, supra note 200. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. A Texas measure was passed by the legislature at the instigation of a federal 
court and is therefore not included in this count. Id. 
 205 LEWIS, supra note 14, at 43.  
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difficult. These were passed in several waves; first in response to 
a 1993 Hawaii Supreme Court decision signaling that the court 
was poised to recognize a state constitutional right to same-sex 
marriage and then, later, in response to a 2003 Massachusetts 
Supreme Court decision recognizing a state constitutional right 
to same-sex marriage.206 The first wave saw passage of a 
Nebraska amendment in 2000207 and a Nevada amendment that 
received its requisite second and final approval in 2002.208 The 
second wave included passage of same-sex marriage-ban 
citizen-initiated amendments in Arkansas,209 Michigan,210 
Montana,211 North Dakota,212 Ohio,213 and Oregon214 in 2004, 
Colorado in 2006,215 and Florida216 and California217 in 2008. In 
only one case, in Arizona in 2006,218 did voters reject a 
citizen-initiated same-sex marriage-ban amendment.  
However, caution is in order in interpreting this evidence. In 
nearly all of these states, and with the notable exception of the 
 
 206 Id. at 18. 
 207 Nebraska Marriage Definition, Measure 416 (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Nebraska_Marriage_Definition_Amendment,_Initiative_416_%282000%29 
[http://perma.cc/2VS8-VYVT]. 
 208 Nevada Marriage Amendment, Question 2 (2002), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Nevada_Marriage_Amendment,_Question_2_%282002%29 [http://perma.cc/8D 
WK-9SBC]. 
 209 Arkansas Same-Sex Marriage Ban, Proposed Constitutional Amendment 3 (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Arkansas_Same-Sex_Marriage_Ban,_Proposed_Con 
stitutional_Amendment_3_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/UW33-DWWL].  
 210 Michigan Marriage Amendment, Proposal 2 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Michigan_Marriage_Amendment,_Proposal_2_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/RY 
35-XQHT]. 
 211 Montana Definition of Marriage, CI-96 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Montana_Definition_of_Marriage,_CI-96_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/2LYQ-
MJAG].  
 212 North Dakota Definition of Marriage, Constitutional Measure 1 (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/North_Dakota_Definition_of_Marriage,_Constitutional_ 
Measure_1_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/2WJ9-C3M6].  
 213 Ohio Definition of Marriage, Amendment 1 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Ohio_Issue_1,_the_Marriage_Amendment_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/FEL7-
HZMT].  
 214 Oregon Marriage Measure 36 (2004), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Oregon_Marriage_Measure_36_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/5WBZ-NY7Z].  
 215 Colorado Definition of Marriage, Initiative 43 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Colorado_Definition_of_Marriage,_Initiative_43_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
ZKE7-ZNQ6]. 
 216 Florida Definition of Marriage, Amendment 2 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Florida_Definition_of_Marriage,_Amendment_2_%282008%29 [http://perma.cc/ 
ZD2K-K2ZW].  
 217 California Proposition 8, the “Eliminates Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry” 
Initiative (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_8,_the_%22 
Eliminates_Right_of_Same-Sex_Couples_to_Marry%22_Initiative_%282008%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/U9D3-U73S].  
 218 Arizona Protect Marriage, Proposition 107 (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Arizona_Protect_Marriage,_Proposition_107_%282006%29 [http://perma.cc/BZY 
6-YSAU].  
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2008 California amendment that overturned a state supreme 
court decision legalizing same-sex marriage, the constitutional 
initiatives barring recognition of same-sex marriage were 
confirming policies already in place, many of which were enacted 
via legislative statute.219 Additionally, and focusing on the total 
universe of thirty same-sex marriage-ban constitutional 
amendments, although eleven were generated via the initiative 
process, the others were enacted via legislature-referred 
amendments.220 Moreover, there is little indication that 
legislatures were more reluctant than citizens to support 
same-sex marriage-ban amendments221 or that amendments 
enacted via legislature-referred processes were less restrictive 
than amendments enacted via constitutional initiative 
processes.222  
In summary, the conclusions to be drawn from the 
twenty-first century record regarding constitutional initiatives 
and rights parallel May’s assessment of the 1906–1986 era. 
Constitutional initiative processes were occasionally used to 
 
 219 See LEWIS, supra note 14, at 20–21.   
 220 A total of thirty constitutional amendments were enacted between 1998 and 2012 
that prohibited the state legislature from recognizing same-sex marriage. In addition, a 
1998 Hawaii constitutional amendment reserved the definition of same-sex marriage to 
the Legislature and thereby prohibited the state supreme court from legalizing same-sex 
marriage. The states adopting same-sex marriage-ban amendments and the dates of 
enactment are listed in States with Constitutional Amendments Banning Gay Marriage, 
PROCON.ORG, http://gaymarriage.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=003979 [http:// 
perma.cc/BGL5-JASK] (last updated May 10, 2012).  
 221  When one takes into account a number of factors, it appears from an empirical 
analysis that states with direct democracy were more likely than other states to approve 
same-sex marriage bans. But in this case, it would be important to distinguish between 
states with constitutional initiative processes and states that only provide for statutory 
initiative processes, given that the key concern was with enacting constitutional 
provisions designed to prevent state courts from issuing decisions requiring legalization of 
same-sex marriage. LEWIS, supra note 14, at 20, 33–34.  
 222  Of the thirty same-sex marriage-ban amendments, twenty were seen as 
comparatively more restrictive, in that they limited recognition of both same-sex marriage 
and civil unions, and in some cases domestic partnerships (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Nebraska, North Carolina, 
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, 
and Wisconsin), whereas ten were seen as comparatively less restrictive in that they only 
barred recognition of same-sex marriage (Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee). For this categorization 
and a list of states in each category, see Daniel R. Pinello, The Difference Between 
Super-DOMAs and Mini-DOMAs, DANPINELLO.COM, http://www.danpinello.com/Super 
DOMAs.htm [http://perma.cc/AZ7S-56GA]. There is little indication that amendments 
passed through the constitutional-initiative process were more restrictive than 
amendments referred to voters by the legislature. Five of the ten less restrictive 
amendments were passed through the constitutional initiative process (California, 
Colorado, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon), whereas the other five were referred to voters 
by the legislature. Meanwhile, six of the twenty more restrictive amendments (Nebraska, 
Arkansas, Michigan, North Dakota, Ohio, and Florida) were passed through the 
constitutional initiative process, whereas the other fourteen were referred to voters by the 
legislature. See supra notes 200–18 and accompanying text. 
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protect rights. They were used more frequently to pass measures 
that could be seen as impairing rights, even allowing for 
disagreement about what counts as a rights-impairing measure. 
However, when comparing constitutional initiative processes 
with processes requiring legislative participation, constitutional 
initiative processes were generally no more likely to be a vehicle 
for approving measures opposed by minority groups, with the 
exception of affirmative-action limits.  
III. OPTIONS FOR DESIGNING CONSTITUTIONAL  
INITIATIVE PROCESSES 
An analysis of twenty-first century constitutional initiative 
use might be helpful not only for scholars interested in whether 
the empirical record supports various claims in the literature, 
but also for citizens and public officials concerned with designing 
constitutional initiative processes to harness their benefits and 
minimize their harms. Citizens and officials in the thirty-two 
states not currently providing for the constitutional initiative 
might benefit from considering various options when establishing 
such a process. Likewise with residents of the eighteen 
constitutional-initiative states—which vary significantly in the 
rules for qualifying measures for the ballot, approving them, and 
specifying the topics they can address. My purpose in this final 
section is identifying the main options to be considered in 
designing a constitutional initiative process and assessing which 
decisions might secure the main benefits (primarily overcoming 
self-interested legislators and secondarily bypassing 
unresponsive legislatures) while also minimizing the main harms 
(primarily constraining policy flexibility and secondarily 
impairing minority rights). 
Students of the constitutional initiative process, and direct 
democratic institutions more broadly, have given some attention 
to reforms that might contribute to more effective governance.223 
Marvin Krislov and Daniel M. Katz, in a 2008 article, “Taking 
State Constitutions Seriously,” analyzed a number of reform 
options, such as increasing signature requirements for qualifying 
constitutional initiatives, adopting an indirect constitutional 
initiative process, requiring a supermajority popular vote to 
approve constitutional initiatives, or requiring popular approval 
 
 223 See generally GERBER, supra note 14; COLO. CONSTITUTION PANEL, UNIV. OF 
DENVER, FOUNDATION OF A GREAT STATE: THE FUTURE OF COLORADO’S CONSTITUTION 
(2007), http://www.du.edu/issues/media/documents/Constitution_Report.pdf [http://perma. 
cc/83WY-DQ77]; NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
THE NCSL I&R TASK FORCE (2002), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/ 
irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf [http://perma.cc/XP5F-W53B]. 
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in consecutive elections.224 Their concerns were primarily with 
improving “the information environment so that voters can 
obtain the proximate data necessary to ensure they vote 
consistent with their individual interests”225 and also better 
distinguishing “between the methods for modifying mere 
statutory law and methods for modifying a state’s 
constitution.”226 
The concerns guiding my analysis in this Article overlap to 
some degree with the concerns of other scholars, especially the 
concern about not entrenching matters in constitutions that are 
more properly placed in statutes, but are also somewhat 
different. In particular, I am concerned with determining how 
constitutional initiative processes can be designed to maximize 
their benefits, while at the same time minimizing harms 
associated with their use. As the previous section demonstrated, 
based on a review of the twenty-first century record, 
constitutional initiative processes have been beneficial primarily 
insofar as they have secured passage of governmental reforms 
resisted by legislators and, secondarily, to the extent that they 
have facilitated enactment of policies blocked by unresponsive 
legislatures. Meanwhile, the record of constitutional initiatives 
enacted in the twenty-first century indicates that the chief 
concern is passage of measures imposing undue constraints on 
policy flexibility, and a secondary concern is the passage of 
measures impairing minority rights. The question is how to 
design a process that maximizes these particular benefits while 
minimizing these specific harms. 
To preview my conclusions, I argue that several proposals, 
such as making it more difficult to qualify measures for the ballot 
or secure voter approval, are unlikely to achieve the desired goals 
of securing the benefits and reducing the harms of the process. 
However, other options—such as permitting legislatures to craft 
alternatives to citizen-initiated amendments as part of an 
indirect constitutional initiative process, requiring voter approval 
of constitutional initiatives in consecutive elections, limiting the 
subject-matter of constitutional initiatives, and protecting 
statutory initiatives—are well tailored to preserving the main 
benefits of the process while reducing the principal harms.  
 
 224 Krislov & Katz, supra note 15. 
 225 Id. at 329–38.  
 226 Id. at 336.  
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A.  Increasing Signature Requirements for Proposing 
Constitutional Initiatives 
One option available to public officials in designing 
constitutional initiative processes is making it more difficult to 
place measures on the ballot, by increasing the signature 
requirements. The eighteen states vary widely in the signature 
requirements they impose, thereby leading some commentators 
to urge states with lower requirements to increase them as a way 
of limiting harmful effects of these processes.227 
Comparing state signature requirements is difficult, because 
of the wide range of ways that states calculate the signatures 
needed to qualify amendments for the ballot. Most states require 
signatures equal to a certain percentage of votes cast for 
governor in the last election.228  But some states base this 
percentage on the number of votes cast for some other office. Still 
other states require signature-gatherers to obtain support from a 
percentage of the state population or of registered voters. 
Nevertheless, and despite the difficulty in making comparisons, 
it is possible to distinguish between certain states that set low 
barriers and others that establish high barriers. Massachusetts 
(3% of votes for Governor) and Colorado (5% of votes for 
Secretary of State) are among the most accessible. At the other 
end of the spectrum are Arizona and Oklahoma, both of which 
require signatures equal to 15% of votes for governor. Nearly half 
of the states go further and mandate that signature-gatherers 
must satisfy a geographic-distribution requirement. These range 
from rules that no more than a certain percentage of the 
signatures can come from a single county (as in Massachusetts) 
or congressional district (as in Mississippi) to rules requiring a 
certain percentage of signatures to be collected in each of 
one-half of the counties (as in Ohio) or in each of one-half of the 
congressional districts (as in Florida).229   
Although increasing the signature requirement and 
tightening geographic-distribution rules are prominent reform 
proposals,230 upon consideration, it is not clear that they would 
 
 227 Id. at 315, 336. 
 228 For a list of the signature requirements set out in this paragraph, see Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2013, supra note 21, at 14 tbl.1.3.  
 229 Id. It should be noted that several court rulings have invalidated 
geographic-distribution requirements. See NOYES, supra note 2, at 256 tbl.6.6. 
 230 Voters in Oregon in 2000 rejected an amendment increasing the signature 
requirement. Oregon Increased Signature Requirements for Constitutional Initiative, 
Measure 79 (May 2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Oregon_Increased_ 
Signature_Requirements_for_Constitutional_Initiative,_Measure_79_%28May_2000%29 
[http://perma.cc/Z9LH-RW85]. Voters in Colorado in 2008 defeated an amendment 
increasing the signature requirement and imposing a geographic-distribution 
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harness the benefits and minimize the harms of the process. 
Higher signature requirements are just as likely to reduce the 
ability to enact measures overcoming resistant or unresponsive 
legislatures as to reduce the likelihood of passing measures 
constraining policy flexibility or restricting rights. There is no 
apparent reason why erecting higher barriers to placing 
measures on the ballot would keep out the harmful measures 
more so than the beneficial measures.  
Additionally, to the extent that the consequences of higher 
signature requirements are likely to cut in favor of certain 
measures and against others, this is likely to be in the direction 
of making it tougher to pass beneficial measures that overcome 
influential and well-organized groups. This has been the 
judgment reached by several groups and commissions who have 
studied the constitutional initiative process. For instance, a 2007 
Colorado Constitution Panel noted in its final report that 
panelists considered increasing the signature requirement (and 
increasing the voter ratification requirement), but ultimately 
rejected this option, because it was  
not likely to reduce the number of petitions from large, well-funded 
special interests. What raising these thresholds is likely to do, 
however, will be to make it more difficult for Colorado-based 
grassroots organizations to get their issues on the ballot. These 
groups, typically less well funded than large national organizations, 
would likely be the ones disadvantaged by changing signature and 
election requirements.231  
B.  Increasing Thresholds for Ratifying Constitutional Initiatives 
Proposals to increase the threshold for voter ratification of 
constitutional initiatives have been advanced with nearly the 
same regularity as proposals to increase signature requirements 
for placing them on the ballot.232 Although there is not a great 
 
requirement. Colorado Citizen-Initiated State Laws, Referendum O (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Citizen-Initiated_State_Laws,_Referendum_O_%282008%29 
[http://perma.cc/U3GD-978R]. 
 231 COLO. CONSTITUTION PANEL, supra note 223, at 11–12. 
 232 In recent decades, measures have occasionally been placed on the ballot to raise 
the threshold for ratifying amendments. At times, they have sought to impose 
supermajority requirements on voter passage of all amendments, as with a failed measure 
in Colorado in 1996. Colorado Amendment Approval, Referendum A (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, 
http://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_Amendment_Approval,_Referendum_A_%281996%29 
[http://perma.cc/3LDE-MQHW]. Such a measure was successfully passed in Florida in 
2006. Florida Amendment 3, Supermajority Vote Required to Approve a Constitutional 
Amendment (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_Super 
majority_Vote_Required_to_Approve_a_Constitutional_Amendment_%282006%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/692F-SX3W]. Other proposals would have imposed a supermajority requirement 
on initiated amendments only. See Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, NAT’L 
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 61, www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_ 
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deal of variation among constitutional-initiative states in their 
voter-ratification thresholds, the differences have given rise to 
discussion about the effects of adopting higher thresholds.233  
Most of the eighteen constitutional-initiative states permit 
approval by a majority of voters, but several set higher 
thresholds.234 In a rule that rarely makes a practical difference, 
several states require the majority of voters approving a 
constitutional initiative to exceed a certain percentage of voters 
participating in the entire election: 35% in Nebraska (a rule that 
also applies to legislature-referred amendments), 30% in 
Massachusetts and 40% in Mississippi. Illinois stipulates that 
constitutional amendments (citizen-initiated as well as 
legislature-referred) must be ratified by either a majority of 
voters participating in the entire election or three-fifths of voters 
casting ballots on the question. Florida sets the highest 
threshold.235 Since 1996, Florida has required two-thirds of 
voters participating in the election to approve all amendments 
imposing new taxes or fees.236 Additionally, after 2006, Florida 
has required other amendments to be approved by three-fifths of 
voters.237  
In assessing the consequences of these different rules, it is 
worth focusing on Florida and comparing the proposal and 
enactment rate of constitutional initiatives before and after the 
post-2006 change (for non-tax increases) from a majority to a 
three-fifths supermajority rule. In the four even-year elections in 
the twenty-first century prior to this change taking effect (2000, 
2002, 2004, and 2006), thirteen constitutional initiatives 
qualified for the ballot and voters ratified all of them.238 
 
report.pdf [http://perma.cc/SE7T-QP23]. 
 233 See Krislov & Katz, supra note 15, at 338. 
 234 For a list of the approval requirements, see Dinan, State Constitutional 
Developments in 2013, supra note 21, at 14 tbl.1.3. One might also take note of another 
requirement along these lines. Oregon requires that initiatives that establish a 
supermajority requirement for approving future acts must themselves be approved by an 
equivalent supermajority of voters. Id. 
 235 The voter-approval requirements for citizen-initiated amendments in these states 
are found in id. For comparison, the voter-approval requirements for legislature-referred 
amendments in each of these states are found in id. at 12–13 tbl.1.2. The voter-approval 
requirement for Nebraska legislature-referred amendments is found in id. at 13 tbl.1.2(f). 
The voter-approval requirement for Illinois legislature-referred amendments is found in 
id. at 13 tbl.1.2(g). 
 236 Florida Tax Limitation, Amendment 1 (1996), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
Florida_Tax_Limitation,_Amendment_1_%281996%29 [http://perma.cc/4V62-UH9M].  
 237 Florida Amendment 3, Supermajority Vote Required to Approve a Constitutional 
Amendment (2006), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Amendment_3,_Super 
majority_Vote_Required_to_Approve_a_Constitutional_Amendment_%282006%29 [http:// 
perma.cc/G98Z-VHJ8].  
 238 The specific totals for each election are as follows. In 2000, voters approved the 
one constitutional initiative on the ballot. May, State Constitutions and Constitutional 
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However, in the four even-year elections held after this change 
(2008, 2010, 2012, and 2014), six constitutional initiatives 
qualified for the ballot and only four of them were approved.239 It 
is reasonable to conclude that increasing the ratification 
requirement prevented some individuals and groups from 
proposing amendments they would otherwise have worked to 
place on the ballot; moreover, the higher ratification threshold 
definitely led to the defeat of one amendment, a 2014 
medical-marijuana legalization measure that attracted the 
support of more than 57% of voters but fell short of the 60% 
threshold.240 
There is little reason to conclude, however, that increasing 
voter ratification requirements in this or other ways would, in 
particular, increase the prospects of passing beneficial measures 
or reduce the prospects of passing harmful measures. By 
definition, the effect of increasing the ratification requirement 
would be to reduce the likelihood of enacting measures enjoying 
the support of a majority of voters, but less than a supermajority. 
But measures defeated with this level of support (a majority but 
not a supermajority) are as likely to be beneficial measures that 
overcome resistant or unresponsive legislatures as harmful 
measures that limit policy flexibility or impair rights. In short, if 
the goal is to reduce the passage rate of all measures, this option 
is likely to be effective; but in so far as the goal is to design the 
process to harness the benefits and minimize the harms, this 
strategy is not well-tailored to this end. 
C.  Requiring Constitutional Initiatives to Be Approved by 
Voters in Consecutive Elections 
Another option adopted by one state, Nevada, and endorsed 
by some commentators, is to require voters to approve 
 
Revision 2000-2001, supra note 21, at 22 tbl.1.6. In 2002, voters approved all five 
constitutional initiatives on the ballot. May, Trends in State Constitutional Amendment 
and Revision, supra note 21, at 18 tbl.1.6. In 2004, voters approved all six constitutional 
initiatives on the ballot. May, State Constitutional Developments in 2004, supra note 21, 
at 18 tbl.1.6. In 2006, voters approved the one constitutional initiative on the ballot. 
Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2006, supra note 21, at 16 tbl.1.5. 
 239 The specific totals for each election are as follows. In 2008, voters approved the 
one constitutional initiative on the ballot. Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 
2008, supra note 21, at 7 tbl.C. In 2010, voters approved two of the three constitutional 
initiatives on the ballot. Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2010, supra note 21, 
at 7 tbl.C. In 2012, no constitutional initiatives qualified for the ballot. Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2012, supra note 21, at 6 tbl.C. In 2014, voters approved 
one of two constitutional initiatives on the ballot. Dinan, State Constitutional 
Developments in 2014, supra note 21, at 6 tbl.C.    
 240 Florida Right to Medical Marijuana Initiative, Amendment 2 (2014), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Florida_Right_to_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative,_ 
Amendment_2_%282014%29 [http://perma.cc/D5TH-T7U2]. 
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constitutional initiatives in two separate elections.241 Nevada is 
the one state to require amendments of any sort to be approved 
by a majority of voters on two separate occasions.242 This 
requirement, dating from 1962, applies only to citizen-initiated 
amendments.243 Legislature-referred amendments are approved 
in a single election.  
Based on the twenty-first century record, it is not evident 
that this requirement has had a meaningful effect. Of the nine 
citizen-initiated amendments appearing on the Nevada ballot 
from 2000–2014, five were approved in consecutive elections and 
took effect; the other four were defeated in the initial vote, with 
no need for a second vote.244 That is, no measures during this 
period (as distinct from the pre-2000 period when this occurred 
on several occasions)245 secured majority support in the first 
election, only to be defeated in the second election.  
Although the double-passage rule has not had an apparent 
effect in Nevada in the twenty-first century, this rule might, 
nevertheless, be considered well-tailored, in certain situations, to 
preserving the benefits of the constitutional initiative process 
while minimizing some potential harms. It is unlikely that this 
requirement would reduce the prospects of passing reforms 
blocked by resistant or unresponsive legislatures but backed by a 
popular majority capable of sustaining such support through 
multiple ballot campaigns. Therefore, adding such a requirement 
 
 241 Krislov & Katz, supra note 15, at 338. 
 242 Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, supra note 21, at 14 tbl.1.3. 
Recent efforts have occasionally been made to impose double-passage rules for all 
constitutional amendments, whether legislature-referred or citizen-initiated, as in 
Nebraska in 2000, where voters rejected such a change. Nebraska Two Votes to Amend 
Constitution, Amendment 3A (2000), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Nebraska_Two_ 
Votes_to_Amend_Constitution,_Amendment_3A_%282000%29 [http://perma.cc/KJ4H-NL9S]. 
 243 MICHAEL W. BOWERS, THE NEVADA STATE CONSTITUTION 180 (2d ed. 2014). 
 244 Regarding the five times that constitutional initiatives were approved in 
consecutive elections during this 2000–2014 period, Nevada voters gave their second 
required approval to one constitutional initiative in 2000, one constitutional initiative in 
2002, two constitutional initiatives in 2006, and one constitutional initiative in 2008. As 
for the four times during this 2000–2014 period that constitutional initiatives were 
rejected during the initial presentation—eliminating the need for a second election—
Nevada voters rejected one amendment in 2002 on its initial presentation and three 
amendments in 2004 on their first presentation. See May, State Constitutions and 
Constitutional Revision 2000-2001, supra note 21, at 22 tbl.1.6; May, Trends in State 
Constitutional Amendment and Revision, supra note 21, at 18 tbl.1.6; May, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2004, supra note 21, at 18 tbl.1.6; Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2006, supra note 21, at 16 tbl.1.5; Dinan, State 
Constitutional Developments in 2008, supra note 21, at 7 tbl.C.   
 245 This occurred on three occasions—in 1980, when a limit on property taxes was 
defeated in the second vote; in 1982, when a ban on taxing food was defeated in the 
second vote; and in 1996, in an unusual situation, in that a measure limiting the terms of 
judges and other state officials had passed in the first vote but when a court ordered the 
measures to be split into separate measures voters defeated term limits for judges and 
approved term limits for other officials. NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, supra note 223, at 60. 
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would still allow beneficial measures to pass. On the other hand, 
requiring voter approval on separate occasions with a two-year 
intervening period could well reduce the likelihood of passing 
measures violating minority rights. That is, to the extent that 
rights-violating measures might be a product of temporary 
passion rather than reasoned judgment, the double-passage 
requirement could help distinguish between measures that are 
supported by an ephemeral majority rather than an enduring 
majority. Measures of the latter kind would withstand the 
double-passage requirement; the former measures might survive 
the initial election only to fail in the next election as popular 
support dissipates.  
D.  Providing for the Indirect Constitutional Initiative 
Another option, in effect in two states and occasionally 
recommended for consideration by other states,246 is to provide 
for an indirect, rather than a direct, constitutional initiative 
process. In sixteen constitutional-initiative states, the legislature 
does not play a role in approving or amending citizen-initiated 
amendments before they are placed on the ballot.247 However, 
Massachusetts and Mississippi provide that citizen-initiated 
amendments receiving the requisite number of signatures must 
first be submitted to the legislature, which has several options 
for responding, depending on the state.248 
In Massachusetts, which adopted the constitutional 
initiative process in 1918, the Legislature can prevent a 
citizen-initiated amendment from appearing on the ballot, or 
craft a substitute amendment to be placed on the ballot alongside 
the original measure, or amend the original measure before it 
appears on the ballot.249 In particular, citizen-initiated 
amendments must secure the approval of one-fourth of the 
members of a joint meeting of both houses of the Legislature and 
in two consecutive legislative sessions.250 The Massachusetts 
Legislature exercised this power to block voter consideration of 
citizen-initiated amendments on one notable occasion in the 
twenty-first century. In response to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court’s 2003 same-sex marriage legalization ruling, opponents 
secured the requisite signatures in 2005 for a citizen-initiated 
amendment limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples.251 The 
 
 246 Id. at 7–8. 
 247 Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2013, supra note 21, at 14 tbl.1.3. 
 248 Id.  
 249 MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII. 
 250 Id. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, § 4. 
 251 Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2007, supra note 21, at 4–5. 
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Legislature eventually gave the requisite first approval to this 
amendment, by a 62–132 vote, on the last day of the legislative 
session, January 2, 2007.252 However, when the amendment was 
taken up in the next session, on June 14, 2007, it failed to secure 
the requisite one-fourth of the votes, failing on a 45–151 vote.253 
The Legislature has two other options for responding to 
citizen-initiated amendments aside from blocking them. It can, 
by a majority vote, approve a substitute amendment that appears 
on the ballot alongside the initiated amendment.254 It can also, by 
a three-fourths vote, amend the original amendment and place 
this on the ballot instead of the initiated amendment.255 The 
Legislature has rarely exercised these options, whether in the 
twenty-first century or in prior years.256 
The Mississippi Legislature is not empowered to block 
citizen-initiated amendments; but it can, by majority vote, craft 
an amended or alternative amendment to be submitted to voters 
alongside of the original measure.257 Mississippi has not had 
extensive experience with the constitutional initiative process 
(originally adopted in the early 1900s, then invalidated by the 
state supreme court in 1922, but reestablished in 1992) and the 
Legislature did not, prior to 2014, exercise its option to craft 
alternative amendments.258 All three citizen-initiated 
amendments securing the requisite number of signatures 
between 2000 and 2014 appeared on the Mississippi ballot 
unaccompanied by legislative alternatives. However, in 2015 the 
Mississippi Legislature, for the first, time approved an 
alternative amendment for submission to voters, in response to a 
citizen-initiated amendment that would revise the state’s 
education clause to guarantee a fundamental right to educational 
opportunities to be enforced by the state chancery courts.259 The 
alternative legislature-crafted amendment would make more 
modest revisions to the education clause and would not include 
fundamental-right or judicial-enforcement language.260 When 
presented with a citizen-initiated amendment and a 
 
 252 Id. at 5. 
 253 Id. 
 254 MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, pt. III, § 2. 
 255 Id. art. XLVIII, pt. IV, § 3. 
 256 Memorandum from Steven H. Steinglass, Senior Policy Advisor, Ohio Constitution 
Modernization Comm’n, on Indirect Constitutional Initiative to Members of the 
Constitutional Revision Comm. 3 (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.ocmc.ohio.gov/ocmc//up 
loads/Constitutional%20Revision%20and%20Updating%20Committee/2014-10-09%20%20 
CRU%20Meeting%20Materials.pdf [http://perma.cc/LDG3-RVUD]. 
 257 MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(6)–(7). 
 258 Steinglass, supra note 256, at 1, 3; see also Dinan, State Constitutional 
Developments in 2014, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
 259 Dinan, State Constitutional Developments in 2014, supra note 21, at 6–7. 
 260 Id.  
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legislature-approved alternative, Mississippi voters are asked 
whether they want to make any change to the current 
constitutional language and, if so, which of the two proposals 
they prefer.261 
In view of the infrequent use of indirect constitutional 
initiative processes in the twenty-first century, any assessment 
of the consequences has to be based less on the empirical record 
than on tendencies of legislative behavior.262 Such an analysis 
would likely lead to a mixed assessment in terms of whether the 
indirect constitutional initiative would preserve the benefits of 
the process while reducing the harms. On one hand, and focusing 
first on the Massachusetts approach, permitting the legislature 
to block initiated amendments would be potentially meritorious 
in preventing passage of harmful measures that violate minority 
rights, given the capability of representative institutions to gain 
distance from popular passions. On the other hand, the 
Massachusetts approach might be just as likely to sacrifice some 
potential benefits of the constitutional initiative, by enabling the 
legislature to block amendments designed to overcome 
legislators’ self-interest. As for the Mississippi approach and the 
ability of legislatures to craft alternative amendments, this 
would not seem to put at risk any of the potential benefits of the 
constitutional initiative, in the sense of overcoming resistant or 
unresponsive legislatures, and it might, under some 
circumstances, minimize the potential harms, in the sense of 
allowing legislators to craft alternative measures imposing fewer 
constraints on policy flexibility.  
E.  Limiting the Subject Matter of Constitutional Initiatives 
Of all the options for designing constitutional initiative 
processes to secure the benefits and reduce the harms, none is 
perhaps better tailored to this goal than specifying the subjects 
that can be addressed through these processes. This approach, 
which has been encouraged by some commentators,263 has been 
followed by several constitutional-initiative states,264 whether in 
the form of provisions specifying permissible topics or 
prohibitions on other topics.265  
 
 261 See MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(8). 
 262 There is much more experience with indirect statutory initiative processes, 
available in seven states. For a list of states, see NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, supra note 223, 
at 8 tbl.1. 
 263 See generally GERALD BENJAMIN, Constitutional Amendment and Revision, in 3 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: THE AGENDA OF STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM 177 (G. Alan Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006).  
 264 See id. at 189. 
 265 MATSUSAKA, supra note 14, at 153–55 tbl.A1.2. 
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Illinois follows the first approach, in specifying that 
citizen-initiated amendments “shall be limited to structural and 
procedural subjects contained in Article IV,” the legislative 
article of the state constitution.266 The logic of confining 
constitutional initiatives in this fashion is apparent. As Gerald 
Benjamin has written, “this is the area of the constitution in 
which the legislature is likely to be most self-interested, and 
therefore least likely to initiate change.”267  
Other states have pursued the second type of approach and 
marked certain subjects as off limits for constitutional 
initiatives.268 In part out of a concern that the process could be 
used to impose undue constraints on budget policy, two states 
prevent initiatives that require specific appropriations of 
funds.269 Massachusetts prohibits initiatives making “a specific 
appropriation of money from the treasury of the 
commonwealth.”270  Missouri does not allow the initiative process 
to “be used for the appropriation of money other than of new 
revenues created and provided for thereby.”271 Meanwhile, after 
passage of a 2004 amendment,272 Arizona initiatives providing for 
appropriation of money for any purpose must “provide for an 
increased source of revenues sufficient to cover the immediate 
and future costs of the proposal.”273  
Out of a concern that initiatives could violate individual 
rights, two states prevent initiatives dealing with bills of rights 
in general or certain rights in particular. Among other 
limitations, Mississippi disallows use of the initiative process 
“[f]or the proposal, modification, or repeal of any portion of the 
Bill of Rights” of its constitution.274 Massachusetts lists a number 
of items off limits for initiatives, including proposals  
inconsistent with any one of the following rights of the individual, as 
at present declared in the declaration of rights . . . [t]he right to 
receive compensation for private property appropriated to public use; 
 
 266 ILL. CONST. art. XIV, § 3. 
 267 BENJAMIN, supra note 263, at 186. 
 268 Id. at 189–90. 
 269 North Dakota voters in 2014 rejected a legislature-referred amendment that 
would have prohibited initiated amendments making an appropriation of funds or 
requiring the legislature to make such an appropriation. North Dakota Referral and 
Initiative Reform Amendment, Measure 4 (2014), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/ 
North_Dakota_Referral_and_Initiative_Reform_Amendment,_Measure_4_%282014%29 
[http://perma.cc/2VPD-QVFU]. 
 270 MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 2. 
 271 MO. CONST. art. III, § 51. 
 272 Arizona Initiative and Referendum Measures, Proposition 101 (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_Initiative_and_Referendum_Measures,_ 
Proposition_101_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/3M2Z-VC8K].  
 273 ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 23. 
 274 MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273(5)(a). 
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the right of access to and protection in courts of justice; the right of 
trial by jury; protection from unreasonable search, unreasonable bail 
and the law martial; freedom of the press; freedom of speech; freedom 
of elections; and the right of peaceable assembly.275  
Massachusetts also bars use of the initiative process for any 
“measure that relates to religion, religious practices or religious 
institutions; or to the appointment, qualification, tenure, 
removal, recall or compensation of judges; or to the reversal of a 
judicial decision; or to the powers, creation or abolition of 
courts.”276 
The advantage of specifying permissible and impermissible 
subjects is that this allows designers of constitutional initiative 
processes to tailor them so they can secure the main benefits and 
minimize the harms associated with their use. To the extent that 
the primary benefit of constitutional initiatives is overcoming 
self-interested legislators, the process can be designed to allow 
citizen-initiated amendments on these matters. In so far as the 
primary concern associated with constitutional initiatives is that 
they impose undue constraints on policy flexibility, and fiscal 
policy in particular, the process can be structured to bar 
measures of this sort. If a secondary concern about constitutional 
initiatives is that they are used to violate individual rights, this 
can be addressed by prohibiting measures dealing with this topic.  
F.  Encouraging Use of Statutory Initiative Processes 
Although the preceding reform options all deal with the 
design of constitutional initiative processes, scholars and public 
officials are aware that the design of statutory initiative 
processes has implications for constitutional initiative usage. In 
particular, some scholars and commentators have argued that 
groups advocating policy changes will sometimes face a choice 
between proceeding through the statutory initiative process or 
through the constitutional initiative process. In a number of 
instances, this choice will not present itself. Changes in 
government structure, for example, will often require passage of 
a constitutional amendment. But in other cases, advocates of 
policy changes will face such a choice of whether to frame their 
proposal on statutory or constitutional grounds and are likely to 
be influenced by the availability of a statutory initiative process, 
the relative ease of proceeding through the statutory or 
constitutional initiative process, and the degree to which 
initiated statutes are protected from legislative interference 
 
 275 MASS. CONST. art. XLVIII, § 2. 
 276 Id. art. XLVIII, § 1. 
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post-enactment. On the view that advocates might in some cases 
choose to propose statutory initiatives when such a process is 
available,277 and more accessible than the constitutional 
initiative process,278 and there is some assurance that initiated 
states are protected from legislative interference,279 analysts 
have recommended that states with the constitutional initiative 
process consider various design options regarding the statutory 
initiative process.280  
In considering the current relationship between 
constitutional and statutory initiative processes, it should first be 
noted that all but three states providing for a constitutional 
initiative process also allow statutory initiatives. Florida (1968), 
Illinois (1970), and Mississippi (1992) adopted the constitutional 
initiative process long after most other constitutional-initiative 
states did so in the Progressive Era,281 and without also adopting 
the statutory initiative process.  
In the fifteen states providing for both processes, all but one 
state makes it easier to enact statutory initiatives than 
constitutional initiatives. This distinction is generally achieved 
in the ballot qualification stage, by requiring more signatures for 
initiated amendments than for initiated statutes.282 Nevada, one 
of only two states maintaining the same signature-gathering 
requirements, achieves this distinction at the ratification stage, 
by requiring constitutional initiatives, but not statutory 
initiatives, to secure voter approval in consecutive elections.283 
Colorado is the only state that does not make a distinction 
between initiated amendments and initiated statutes in 
ballot-qualification or voter-ratification rules.284  
As for the rules regarding post-enactment modification of 
initiated statutes in the fifteen states with constitutional and 
statutory initiative processes, seven states provide some level of 
protection against legislative amendment or repeal.285 This is 
 
 277 See NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, supra note 223, at 10 (advancing this 
recommendation).  
 278 See Krislov & Katz, supra note 15, at 337 (advancing this recommendation). 
 279 COLO. CONSTITUTION PANEL, supra note 216, at 11. 
 280 See NCSL I&R TASK FORCE, supra note 223, at 10–11. 
 281 Montana and South Dakota are the only other two states to adopt the 
constitutional initiative process after the Progressive Era. Both states initially provided 
only for statutory initiatives and then added the constitutional initiative process in 1972. 
See JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 313 n.132 (2006); 
MATSUSAKA, supra note 14, at 149–52 tbl.A1.1. 
 282 See MATSUSAKA, supra note 14, at 149–52 tbl.A1.1. 
 283 Id. at 151 tbl.A1.1. 
 284 Id. at 149. Colorado voters in 2008 rejected a legislature-referred amendment that 
would, among other things, have introduced such a distinction. Colorado Citizen-Initiated 
State Laws, Referendum O (2008), supra note 230. 
 285 NOYES, supra note 2, at 337 tbl.8.3.  
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generally achieved by requiring any efforts by the legislature to 
amend or repeal an initiated statute to secure a legislative 
supermajority vote, whether a two-thirds vote, as in Arkansas, 
Nebraska, and North Dakota (during the first seven years 
post-enactment), or a three-fourths vote, as in Michigan or 
Arizona.286 Some of these states go even further. Arizona does not 
allow the Legislature to repeal initiated statutes; it may only 
amend them in keeping with the purpose of the statute. Nevada 
does not allow legislative repeal or amendment for three years 
after enactment. California imposes a permanent bar against the 
Legislature repealing or amending an initiated statute unless 
expressly permitted by the ballot initiative.287 These various 
protections for statutory initiatives were in some cases adopted 
in recent decades. For instance, some of the heightened 
protections for Arizona statutory initiatives were adopted via a 
1998 constitutional initiative.288 And the Nebraska rule was 
adopted in 2004, through a constitutional initiative backed by 
pro-gaming groups who were also supporting several other 
pro-gaming statutory initiatives on the ballot the same year.289 
In assessing whether proposals to increase the accessibility 
and attractiveness of the statutory initiative process would secure 
the benefits and minimize the harms associated with the 
constitutional initiative process, the main consideration is 
whether they would reduce the prospects of enacting any harmful 
constitutional initiatives by diverting advocates to the statutory 
initiative process. That is, any effort to add a statutory initiative 
process in constitutional-initiative states currently lacking such a 
process, or reduce the signature requirements for qualifying 
statutory initiatives for the ballot, or prevent legislative 
impairment of initiated statutes is unlikely to sacrifice any of the 
benefits associated with the constitutional initiative process; but 
some of these proposals (especially ensuring the availability of a 
statutory initiative process and protecting initiated statutes) 
could, under some circumstances, reduce potential harms 
(especially regarding constraints on policy flexibility).  
To consider the effects of specific reforms, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the absence of a statutory initiative process in 
Florida could have accounted for the sizable number of 
 
 286 Id. 
 287 Id. 
 288 Arizona Voter Protection, Proposition 105 (1998), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballot 
pedia.org/Arizona_Voter_Protection,_Proposition_105_%281998%29 [http://perma.cc/X7V 
R-LGFJ]. 
 289 Nebraska Legislative Majority to Modify Initiatives, Measure 418 (2004), 
BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/Nebraska_2/3_Legislative_Majority_to_Modify_Initia 
tives_Amendment,_Measure_418_%282004%29 [http://perma.cc/46LF-TFGV]. 
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constitutional initiatives enacted between 2000 and 2014, more 
than any other state. To the extent that some constitutional 
initiatives in Florida were motivated by a desire to adopt policies 
blocked by the Legislature, this energy might have been diverted 
to the statutory initiative process if such a process were 
available, and with the effect of reducing constraints on policy 
flexibility. Additionally, to the extent that some constitutional 
initiatives adopted in other states were motivated by a desire to 
entrench policies against legislative interference, this energy 
might have been diverted to the statutory initiative process if 
initiated statutes were afforded a greater degree of protection 
from legislative changes. Here as well, diverting this energy to 
the statutory initiative process and requiring a supermajority 
legislative vote for changes to initiated statutes would impose 
somewhat fewer constraints on policy flexibility than enshrining 
these policy changes in constitutional provisions.  
CONCLUSION  
State constitutional initiative processes are a vehicle for 
enacting a number of consequential measures and have attracted 
significant attention from scholars and public officials concerned 
with whether these processes are beneficial or harmful for 
governance and with how they might be designed to contribute to 
effective governance. My purpose has been to compile a data-set 
of twenty-first century constitutional initiatives in order to 
permit an empirical assessment of various claims about the 
effects of these processes and thereby contribute to a better 
understanding of the consequences of leading reform proposals.  
Several lessons can be drawn from the eighty-three 
citizen-initiated amendments enacted from 2000–2014. On one 
hand, constitutional initiatives have regularly enacted structural 
reforms resisted by self-interested legislators and occasionally 
adopted policies in the face of unresponsive legislatures. At the 
same time, constitutional initiatives have imposed undue 
constraints on policy flexibility in notable ways and led to  
passage of measures opposed by minority groups on an occasional 
basis. 
In considering how constitutional initiative processes can be 
designed to promote the potential benefits and minimize the 
possible harms associated with use of these processes, it becomes 
possible to identify several proposals that are better tailored than 
others to achieving this goal. On one hand, making it more 
difficult to place constitutional initiatives on the ballot or for 
voters to approve them would be as likely to sacrifice the benefits 
as to reduce the harms of the process. On the other hand, 
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requiring voter approval of citizen-initiated amendments in 
consecutive elections, permitting legislatures to craft alternatives 
to citizen-initiated amendments, and instituting and providing 
greater protection for statutory initiatives are all capable, in 
certain circumstances, of reducing the harms while preserving 
the main benefits of the process. Finally, the design option that is 
best tailored to achieving this goal is limiting the subject matter 
of constitutional initiatives in various ways. 
